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Abstract	  Large	  dams,	   a	   tool	   for	  development	   in	   the	  past	   century,	  have	  changed	   the	   lives	  of	  millions,	   altered	   nations	   and	   had	  widespread	   environmental,	   economic	   and	   social	  effects.	  Whether	  dams	  ultimately	  bring	  more	  good	  or	  ill	  remains	  an	  open	  question.	  With	   the	   increasing	   amount	  of	  data	   available,	   the	   effects	   of	  dams	   can	  be	   assessed	  with	  greater	  accuracy	  and	  validity.	  	  	  This	   thesis	   examines	   the	   evaluation	   of	   the	   economic,	   environmental	   and	   social	  effects	   of	   dams,	   and	   lessons	   learned	   from	   previous	   dams.	   It	   then	   focuses	   on	   cost	  benefit	   analysis	   as	   a	   decision-­‐making	   tool	   pre-­‐project	   for	   evaluating	   the	   potential	  gains	   and	   losses	   of	   building	   a	   dam;	   and	   as	   a	   framework	   for	   evaluating	   dams	   in	  operation.	   It	   reviews	   the	   basic	   assumptions	   required	   for	   a	   legitimate	   cost	   benefit	  analysis,	  and	  the	  inherent	  limitations	  of	  this	  method.	  It	  uses	  the	  Sardar	  Sarovar	  dam	  as	   a	   case	   study	   for	   the	   use	   and	   abuse	   of	   cost	   benefit	   analysis	   in	   decision-­‐making,	  interstate	   politics,	   propaganda	   and	   activism.	   It	   also	   illustrates	   the	   difficulties	   in	  dividing	  costs	  and	  benefits	  in	  an	  equitable	  manner	  at	  national,	  state,	  and	  grassroots	  levels.	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Introduction	  The	   debate	   on	   large	   dams	   has	   been	   ongoing	   since	   the	   1970s,	   when	  environmental	  groups	  first	  mobilized	  to	  oppose	   large-­‐scale	  dam	  projects	   in	  the	  US	  and	   in	  developing	  countries	  around	  the	  world.	  Given	  that	  so	  much	   is	  at	  stake,	  one	  could	  reasonably	  imagine	  that	  studies	  would	  have	  shown	  convincing	  evidence	  that	  dams	   have	   or	   have	   not	   ultimately	   brought	  more	   good	   than	   harm.	   However,	   until	  recently,	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case.	  	  	  In	   the	   interests	   of	   attempting	   to	   answer	   this	   important	   and	   unresolved	  question,	   The	   World	   Commission	   on	   Dams	   (WCD)	   conducted	   a	   thorough	   and	  systematic	  evaluation	  of	  dams	  in	  1999,	  publishing	  their	  report	  in	  2000.	  Their	  report	  concluded	   that	   while	   dams	   are	   a	   flawed	   option,	   they	   are	   still	   necessary	   for	  development.	   The	   question	   of	   whether,	   and	   how,	   dams	  might	   be	   beneficial	   to	   all	  parties	  is	  unresolved,	  but	  worth	  investigation.	  	  	   	  The	   economic	   viability	   and	   benefit	   of	   dams	   also	   applies	   to	   larger	   issues	   of	  policy-­‐making	  regarding	  infrastructure.	  Many	  policies	  involve	  trade-­‐offs,	  and	  dams	  are	   particularly	   complex	   as	   they	   encompass	   social,	   religious,	   environmental,	   and	  economic	  factors.	  	  My	   paper	   begins	   by	   outlining	   the	  modern	   history	   of	   dam	   construction	   and	  evaluation.	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  economic	  theory	  behind	  dams,	  and	  different	  factors	  to	  consider	  when	  using	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  decision-­‐making.	  I	  will	  then	  evaluate	  several	  aspects	  of	  past	  dams’	  performance	  —	  financially,	  environmentally	  and	   socially	  —	  based	  on	   the	  WCD	  and	  other	   studies.	   These	   studies	   reveal	   a	   large	  variance	   in	  performance	  of	   dams,	   from	  dams	   such	   as	   the	  High	  Aswan	  Dam	  which	  
	  4	  	  has	  created	  huge	  economic	  benefits	  to	  Egypt,	  to	  dams	  which	  have	  only	  produced	  a	  fraction	   of	   their	   projected	   potential	   after	   creating	   environmental	   destruction,	  massive	   destruction	   and	   huge	   cost	   overruns.	  With	   the	   studies	  we	   have	   currently,	  conducting	  cost-­‐benefit	  analyses	  across	  multiple	  dams	  and	  multiple	  countries	  yields	  no	   definitive	   answer	   as	   to	   whether	   dams	   cause	   more	   good	   or	   more	   harm	   to	   a	  country.	  The	  more	   interesting	  question	   is	   to	  what	   extent	  using	   cost-­‐benefit	   analysis	  affects	  the	  eventual	  outcome	  of	  a	  dam.	  I	  conduct	  a	  historical,	  economic	  and	  political	  analysis	   of	   one	  dam	  project,	   the	   Sardar	   Sarovar	  Project	   in	   India,	   to	   illustrate	   how	  political	  needs	  and	  entrenched	  interests,	  not	  economic	  cost-­‐benefit	  calculations,	  are	  the	  main	   factor	   that	   determines	   the	   decision	  whether	   or	   not	   to	   build	   a	   dam,	   and	  decisions	   thereafter.	   I	   argue	   that	   this	   is	   the	   rule,	   not	   exception,	   in	   building	   large	  dams,	  and	  ground	  this	  in	  a	  strong	  critique	  of	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis.	  	  It	  would	  be	  practically	  impossible	  to	  come	  to	  a	  consensus	  on	  whether	  dams	  have	   created	   net	   benefits	   or	   costs	   to	   the	   world,	   as	   every	   aspect	   of	   cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	   done	   post-­‐ante	   is	   highly	   dependent	   on	   details	   of	   implementation	   and	  political	  will	   to	  compensate	  losers	  rather	  than	  the	  initial	  conditions.	  Pro-­‐	  and	  anti-­‐dam	  groups	  argue	  about	  the	  economic	  benefits	  or	  costs	  of	  a	  dam,	  but	  the	  real	  debate	  is	  about	  conflicting	  visions	  of	  development.	  The	  widespread	  attention	  on	  the	  Sardar	  Sarovar	  Project	  and	  other	  large	  dam	  projects	  have	  brought	  into	  focus	  issues	  such	  as	  sustainability	  and	  equitability	  that	  test	  the	  constraints	  of	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  framework.	  As	   our	   world’s	   resources	   become	   more	   constrained,	   these	   concerns	   will	   become	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Chapter	  1.	  The	  Politics	  and	  Economics	  of	  Dams	  	  
	  
Relevant	  History	  of	  Dams	  	  	   Dams	   are	   defined	   as	   structures	   that	   regulate,	   store	   and	   divert	   water	   from	  rivers.	  They	  provide	  water	  for	  agricultural	  irrigation,	  household	  and	  industrial	  use,	  and	   are	   used	   for	   electricity	   generation,	   and	   flood	   control.	   Dams	   have	   been	   built	  since	   at	   least	   3000	   BC	   in	   parts	   of	   the	   Middle	   East,	   but	   the	   modern	   era	   of	   dam	  building	  started	   in	   the	  1940s	  and	  peaked	   in	   the	  1970s.	  Large	  dams,	  as	  defined	  by	  the	   International	   Commission	   on	   Large	   Dams	   (ICOLD),	   are	   dams	   with	   a	   height	  exceeding	  15	  meters.	  In	  2000,	  there	  were	  over	  45,000	  large	  dams	  in	  140	  countries.	  The	   top	   five	   dam-­‐building	   countries	   account	   for	   nearly	   80%	   of	   all	   large	   dams	  worldwide,	  with	  China	  alone	  accounting	  for	  close	  to	  half	  of	  them	  (WCD	  9).	  	  	  	   Dams	  have	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  economic	  development	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	   Irrigated	   agriculture	   accounts	   for	   about	   40%	   of	   the	   world’s	   agricultural	  production,	  and	  dams	  supply	  up	  to	  100%	  of	  water	  for	  irrigated	  production	  in	  some	  countries	  such	  as	  Egypt	  (WCD	  13).	  Over	  150	  countries	  use	  hydropower	  to	  generate	  electricity,	  with	  24	  countries	  generating	  more	   than	  90%	  of	   their	  electricity	  supply	  from	  hydropower,	  and	  another	  63	  countries	  generating	  more	  than	  50%	  (WCD	  14).	  	  	   Dam	   construction	   on	   a	   large	   scale	   began	   in	   the	   early	   1900s,	   mostly	   in	  industrialized	  countries.	  After	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  a	  sustained	  period	  of	   economic	   growth	   and	   stability	   spurred	   an	   increase	   in	   global	   dam	   construction	  that	   continued	   into	   the	  1970s	   and	  1980s,	   before	  dropping	   equally	  quickly.	  By	   the	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  mid-­‐1970s,	   Europe,	   the	   U.S.	   and	   Canada	   had	   already	   exploited	   most	   of	   the	  economical	  sites	  for	  dam	  construction	  in	  their	  countries.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  Japan,	  the	  locus	  of	  dam	  construction	  had	  moved	  to	  the	  developing	  world.	  Dam	  construction	  peaked	  in	  the	  1970s,	  with	  two	  to	  three	  large	  dams	  being	  commissioned	  everyday	  in	  the	  world	  (WCD	  10).	  
	  
Source:	  WCD	  9	  	   For	  newly	  independent	  countries	  in	  the	  developing	  world,	  dam	  projects	  were	  often	  the	  largest	  ongoing	  public	  investment	  project.	  Dams	  were	  seen	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  national	   development	   and	   pride,	   enormous	   monuments	   to	   progress	   and	   modern	  achievement.	  The	   first	  prime	  minister	  of	   India,	   Jawaharlal	  Nehru,	  praised	  dams	  as	  the	  new	  temples	  of	  modern	  India.	  	  
	  8	  	   Geopolitical	   strategy	   also	   affected	   the	   construction	   and	   subsequent	   public	  perception	   of	   large	   dams	   in	   the	   developing	   world,	   with	   the	   Aswan	   High	   Dam	   in	  Egypt,	   conceived	  and	  constructed	   in	   the	  Cold	  War	  period	   in	   the	  1950s	  and	  1960s,	  being	  a	  prime	  example.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  expand	  their	  influence	  and	  goodwill	  in	  Africa,	  	  The	   World	   Bank	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   American	   and	   British	   governments	  originally	   proposed	   funding	   the	   Aswan	   dam.	   This	   funding	   was	   contingent	   on	   a	  number	   of	   conditions,	   one	   of	   which	   was	   that	   the	   Egyptian	   government	   avoid	  ‘imprudent	   financial	   decisions’,	   mainly	   purchasing	   arms	   from	   the	   USSR.	   The	  Egyptian	  government	  (under	  Colonel	  Gamal	  Abdel	  Nasser)	  refused	  these	  terms,	  and	  after	   months	   of	   negotiations,	   the	   Western	   bloc	   withdrew	   their	   proposal	   and	   the	  USSR	  stepped	  in	  to	  fund	  the	  dam	  instead.	  The	  economic	  justifications	  for	  the	  Aswan	  High	   Dam	  were	   ‘based	   on	   rough	   estimates…never	   refined’	   and	   ‘ignored	   accepted	  means	   of	   assessing	   projects…for	   which	   an	   extensive	   literature	   was	   available’	  (McCully	  238).	  	  Not	  only	  was	   the	  decision	   to	  build	   the	  dam	  a	  politically-­‐motivated	  one,	   the	  criticism	  of	   the	  dam	  from	  the	  West	  after	   the	  USSR	   funded	   the	  project	  was	  at	   least	  partially	  politically-­‐motivated	   (Biswas	   and	  Tortajada	  2001).	   Soon	  after	   the	  Aswan	  High	  Dam	  was	  built,	  American	  journalists	  published	  a	  series	  of	  articles	  condemning	  it	   for	   the	   social,	   environmental	   and	   economic	   harm	   it	   caused.	   In	   the	   Cold	   War	  climate,	   it	   is	   uncertain	   to	  what	   proportion	   the	   criticism	   stemmed	   from	   it	   being	   a	  project	   funded	   by	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   and	   what	   proportion	   was	   due	   to	   the	   cited	  	  concerns.	   A	   subsequent	   study	   conducted	   by	   the	   Canadian	   International	  Development	  Agency	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s,	  	  concluded	  that	  it	  was	  one	  of	  the	  best	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   of	   its	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   net	   impact	   on	   the	  economic	  development	  in	  Egypt.	  Hence,	  evaluations	  of	  dams	  are	  also	  not	  necessarily	  unbiased,	  a	  problem	  that	  we	  encounter	  again	  in	  modern	  attempts	  to	  evaluate	  dams.	  	  The	  environmental	   impacts	  of	  dams	  were	  not	  well	  understood	   in	   this	  early	  period.	   Environmental	   impact	   assessment	   was	   not	   included	   as	   a	   criterion	   for	  projects	  until	  the	  National	  Environmental	  Protection	  Act	  (NEPA)	  was	  passed	  in	  the	  United	   States	   in	   1969.	   The	   rise	   in	   public	   awareness	   and	   advocacy	   against	   the	  adverse	  environmental	  effects	  of	  dams	  coincided	  with	  the	  shift	  of	  dam	  construction	  from	  the	  developed	  to	  the	  developing	  world.	  Northern	  activist	  groups	  and	  affected	  groups’	   associations	   in	   the	   developing	   world	   formed	   alliances	   to	   oppose	   dams	  worldwide,	  on	  environmental	   and	  human	  rights	  objections.	  As	  a	   result,	   the	  World	  Bank	  adopted	  an	  internal	  directive	  on	  indigenous	  peoples	   in	  1982	  and	  established	  an	  appeals	  mechanism	  in	  1993	  (WCD	  19).	  Shifting	  public	  opinion,	  a	  change	  in	  dam	  financing	  from	  public	  to	  private	  sources,	  and	  increasing	  costs	  of	  large	  dams	  resulted	  in	  a	  decrease	  in	  dam	  construction	  across	  the	  world	  from	  the	  1970s.	  As	  dam	  building	  in	   developed	   countries	   has	   largely	   stopped	   since	   the	   1970s,	   most	   of	   the	   activist	  effort	  against	  dams	  has	  taken	  place	  in	  the	  developing	  world.	  Both	   proponents	   and	   critics	   of	   large	   dams	   agree	   that	   there	   is	   a	   lack	   of	  systematic	   documentation	   and	   evaluation	   of	   dam	   operations,	   particularly	   those	  completed	  10	   to	  20	  years	  after	  commission.	  The	  World	  Commission	  on	  Dams	  was	  formed	  to	  remedy	  this.	  	  Its	  two	  aims	  were	  to	  ‘review	  the	  development	  effectiveness	  of	  large	  dams	  and	  assess	  alternatives	  for	  water	  resources	  and	  energy	  development’,	  and	  to	  	  ‘develop	  internationally	  acceptable	  criteria,	  guidelines	  and	  standards	  where	  
	  10	  	  appropriate,	  for	  the	  planning,	  design,	  appraisal,	  construction,	  operation,	  monitoring	  and	  decommissioning	  of	  dams’	  (xxx).	  	  The	  WCD	  examined	  1,000	  dams	  of	  various	  sizes,	  and	  conducted	  in-­‐depth	  case	  studies	  of	  eight	   large	  dams	  on	  four	  continents;	  and	  reviewed	  two	  countries	  (China	  and	  India).	  The	  WCD	  members	  included	  well-­‐respected	  representatives	  of	  both	  the	  pro	   and	   anti-­‐dam	   establishment.	   Its	   report	   is	   the	   most	   bipartisan	   and	  comprehensive	  evaluation	  of	   large	  dams	  to	  date,	  and	  I	  have	  used	  their	  data	  as	   the	  backbone	   of	   my	   global	   analysis	   of	   dams’	   performance.	   The	   release	   of	   the	   WCD	  report	   in	  2000	   rejuvenated	   interest	   in	   the	   study	  of	  dams,	   and	  many	  other	   studies	  assessing	  the	  impact	  of	  dams	  have	  since	  been	  published.	  Reaction	  to	  the	  WCD	  report	  was	  mixed:	  some	  governments	  such	  as	  Sweden	  and	   Germany	   applauded	   the	   WCD’s	   findings	   and	   incorporated	   their	  recommendations	   as	   criteria	   for	   financing	   dam	   projects.	   	   Other	   governments,	  particularly	   those	   in	   two	   of	   the	   largest	   dam-­‐building	   countries,	   India	   and	   China,	  rejected	  the	  report.	  Significantly,	  the	  World	  Bank,	  one	  of	  the	  major	  sources	  of	  dam	  funding	   and	   an	   initial	   supporter	   of	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	  WCD,	   distanced	   itself	  from	  the	  report	  and	  did	  not	  adopt	  the	  report’s	  recommendations	  in	  their	  published	  studies	  of	  impact	  assessments	  or	  their	  policies	  on	  resettlement	  of	  displaced	  peoples	  (Scudder	  11;	  Biswas	  2012,	  viii).	  Fujikura	   and	   Nakayama	   analyzed	   the	   WCD	   report	   and	   identified	   key	  weaknesses	   which	   prevented	   it	   from	   being	   widely	   adopted:	   vague	   guidelines,	  unrealistic	   standards	   that	   were	   not	   achievable,	   and	   inconsistencies	   between	   the	  evaluation	  data	  in	  Part	  I	  and	  recommendations	  and	  policy	  in	  Part	  II	   	  (Fujikura	  and	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  Nakayama	  2009).	   	  The	  lack	  of	  substantial	  World	  Bank	  involvement	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  presence	  of	   a	  World	  Bank	  Commissioner	   on	   the	  panel,	   or	   by	   greater	   focus	  on	  World	   bBank	   dam	   projects)	   may	   have	   hampered	   the	   acceptance	   of	   the	   WCD’s	  recommendations.	   	   Although	   the	   release	   of	   the	  WCD	   Report	   did	   not	   significantly	  change	  dam	  projects	  and	  water	  management	  policies	  as	   its	  authors	  had	  hoped,	   its	  evaluations	  questioned	  the	  dogma	  of	  infrastructure	  development	  inevitably	  leading	  to	  broad-­‐based	  economic	  growth,	  an	  idea	  based	  on	  economic	  models	  created	  at	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  other	  development	  agencies.	  	  	  
Economic	  Models:	  Public	  Goods,	  Development	  and	  Cost	  Benefit	  Analysis	  	   Economic	   models	   assessing	   the	   viability	   of	   expensive	   large-­‐scale	  development	   projects	   often	   utilize	   the	   concept	   of	   public	   good.	   A	   public	   good	   is	  defined	   as	   a	   good	   that	   is	   non-­‐rivalrous	   and	   non-­‐excludable.	   Dams	   share	   those	  qualities,	   to	   some	   extent.	   Power	   generated	   by	   a	   hydroelectric	   dam	   increases	   the	  amount	   of	   energy	   capacity	   available,	   driving	   down	   the	   price	   of	   electricity	   for	   all.	  Farmers	   living	  downstream	  of	   a	  dam	  also	  benefit	   from	  better	   irrigation	  and	   flood	  control,	  which	  lead	  to	  improvements	  in	  crop	  yields.	  These	  benefits	  are	  non-­‐rivalrous,	  as	   one	   person’s	   benefit	   of	   having	   fewer	   floods	   does	   not	   reduce	   another	   person’s	  benefit;	  and	  non-­‐excludable,	  as	  no	  one	  in	  the	  downstream	  vicinity	  is	  excluded	  from	  benefitting	   from	  the	  dam.	  Due	  to	  the	  expense	  and	  risk	   involved	   in	  building	  a	  dam,	  the	  state	  often	  takes	  the	  responsibility	  of	  investment.	  	  However,	   unlike	   morally	   unambiguous	   public	   goods	   such	   as	   lighthouses,	  large	  dams	  also	  impose	  huge	  environmental	  and	  social	  costs.	  Historically,	  many	  dam	  projects	  were	  evaluated	  based	  only	  on	  projected	  economic	  benefits	  and	   the	  direct	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  cost	   of	   dam	   construction,	   ignoring	   the	   other	   potential	   losses	   in	   environmental	  degradation,	   cultural	   destruction	   and	  displacement	   of	   affected	  peoples.	  When	  one	  factors	  in	  these	  negative	  externalities,	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  dams	  are	  net	  positive	  or	  net	  negative.	  In	  addition,	  dams	  and	  other	  large	  infrastructure	  projects	  are	  prone	  to	  cost	   overruns	   and	   delays,	   which	   can	   turn	   an	   initially	   net-­‐positive	   project	   in	   net-­‐negative	  by	  the	  time	  of	  completion.	  	  	   For	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  dams	  were	  a	  popular	  development	  tool,	  with	   the	   World	   Bank	   and	   other	   credit	   organizations	   from	   the	   developed	   world	  pouring	  massive	   loans	   into	  building	  dams	   in	   the	  developing	  world.	  This	   coincided	  with	   the	   Big	   Push	  model,	   outlined	   by	   Paul	   Rosenstein-­‐Rodan	   in	   1943,	   that	   states	  that	  ‘even	  the	  simplest	  [economic]	  activity	  requires	  a	  network	  of	  other	  activities	  and	  that	   individual	   firms	   cannot	   organize	   such	   a	   large	   network,	   so	   the	   state	   or	   some	  other	  large	  agency	  must	  step	  in’	  (3).	  The	  theory	  posits	  that	  as	  poor	  countries	  do	  not	  have	   the	   capital	   to	   fund	   all	   these	   interconnected	   investments,	   they	   are	   stuck	   in	   a	  poverty	  trap	  of	  zero	  economic	  growth.	  To	  get	  out	  of	  the	  poverty	  trap	  requires	  a	  Big	  Push	  in	  foreign	  aid	  and	  investment,	  leading	  to	  a	  country’s	  take-­‐off	  in	  income.	  Dams	  are	   an	   example	   of	   a	   ‘node’	   in	   the	   network	   that,	   in	   theory,	   would	   accelerate	   the	  economic	   development	   of	   a	   country	   by	   reducing	   agricultural	   shocks,	   ensuring	   a	  steady	   supply	   of	   freshwater,	   and	   enhancing	   agricultural	   productivity.	   The	   World	  Bank,	  the	  leading	  donor	  financing	  large	  dams,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	   International	  Finance	  Corporation	  and	  various	  regional	  banks,	  enthusiastically	  backed	  this	  theory	  (Scudder	  270).	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   Nevertheless,	   recent	   historical	   analysis	   has	   shown	   that	   a	   Big	   Push	   alone	   is	  not	  enough	  to	  ensure	  development,	  particularly	  as	  large	  infrastructure	  projects	  are	  prone	   to	  corruption,	   regulatory	  capture,	  and	  mismanagement.	  As	  William	  Easterly	  points	   out,	   the	   Big	   Push	   theory	   of	   the	   1950s	   and	   the	   current	   Big	   Push	   theory	  popularized	  by	  the	  economist	  Jeffrey	  Sachs	  both	  do	  not	  give	  enough	  emphasis	  to	  the	  role	  of	   good	  governance	   in	   economic	  development	   (294).	   Easterly’s	   own	   research	  finds	  no	  proof	  for	  the	  poverty	  trap	  narrative,	  showing	  with	  simple	  regressions	  that	  poor	  countries’	  growth	  rates	  are	  more	  associated	  with	  bad	  government	  than	  initial	  income.	   The	   data	   also	   disproves	   the	   narrative	   of	   zero	   economic	   growth	   in	   poor	  countries.	   Takeoffs	   in	   growth	   are	   also	   rarely	   associated	   with	   foreign	   aid	   and	  investment	  in	  the	  way	  the	  Big	  Push	  theory	  would	  imply	  (Easterly	  315).	  	  	   The	  cost	  benefit	  analysis	  is	  a	  useful	  tool	  in	  deciding	  whether	  a	  proposed	  dam	  is	   the	  best	  option.	  Cost	  benefit	  analysis	  originated	  with	  the	  Kaldor-­‐Hicks	  criterion,	  which	  states	   that	  a	  public	  policy	   is	   justified	   if	   it	  produces	  social	  gains	   in	  excess	  of	  social	  losses,	  so	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  from	  the	  policy	  to	  compensate	  losers.	  Whether	  or	  not	   this	   actually	   happens	   is	   irrelevant,	   as	   economists	   were	   concerned	   with	  separating	   the	   efficiency	   question	   from	   the	   equity	   question.	   Nevertheless,	   in	   the	  long-­‐term,	   technological	   gains	   would	   bring	   growth	   to	   the	   entire	   company,	  benefitting	   the	   initial	   losers	   as	  well	   as	  winners.	   This	  would	   create	   a	   true	   Pareto-­‐improvement	  (Persky	  2001).	  	  	  	   A	   simple	   cost	   benefit	   analysis	   would	   consist	   of	   calculating	   the	   projected	  economic	  benefit	  of	  the	  dam	  and	  weighing	  it	  against	  the	  economic	  cost	  of	  building	  a	  dam.	   Increased	   agricultural	   productivity	   does	   not	   necessarily	   lead	   to	   increased	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  income,	  since	  a	  large	  increase	  in	  supply	  of	  agriculture,	  all	  else	  equal,	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  drop	  in	  agricultural	  prices.	  The	  dam	  should	  also	  be	  weighed	  against	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  other	  critical	  infrastructure	  projects	  and	  water-­‐management	  solutions.	  If	  the	  dam	  project	  has	  the	  highest	  estimated	  rate	  of	  return,	  then	  planners	  ought	  to	  move	  forward	  with	  it.	  	  If	  it	  does	  not,	  another	  project	  should	  be	  chosen.	  	  	  	   More	   sophisticated	   cost-­‐benefit	   analysis	   models	   have	   been	   proposed	   to	  account	  for	  environmental	  and	  social	  impact	  of	  dams.	  Long-­‐term	  environmental	  cost	  must	   be	   taken	   into	   account,	   as	   negative	   environmental	   effects	  may	  not	   be	   felt	   for	  decades.	   Uncertainty	   and	   irreversibility	   when	   dealing	   with	   environmental	   costs	  make	   valuation	   extremely	   difficult	   (Atkinson	   and	   Mourato	   2008).	   Faced	   with	  uncertainty,	  economists	  sometimes	  use	  a	  quasi-­‐option	  value,	  which	  errs	  to	  the	  side	  of	  caution	  when	  dealing	  with	  decisions	  that	  entail	  losing	  environmental	  assets	  such	  as	  ecosystems.	  	  	   Environmental	   impact	   assessments	   have	   become,	   at	   least	   on	   paper,	   an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  cost	  benefit	  evaluation	  process	  prior	  to	  building	  a	  dam.	  Biswas	  suggests	   that	   the	   current	   model	   of	   EIAs	   are	   fundamentally	   flawed	   as	   they	   only	  consider	   the	   negative	   impacts	   of	   a	   proposed	   project,	   rather	   than	   a	   two-­‐pronged	  approach	  that	  identifies	  the	  positive	  benefits	  and	  how	  to	  maximize	  them,	  as	  well	  as	  an	   assessment	   of	   negative	   impacts	   and	   how	   to	  minimize	   them	  with	   policy	   action	  (13).	  The	  current	  model,	  he	  argues,	  does	  not	  provide	  enough	  information	  for	  sound,	  long-­‐term	  decision-­‐making	  by	  governments.	  	  	   The	  danger	  with	  Biswas’	  proposed	  two-­‐pronged	  process	  is	  that	  the	  positive	  benefits	   are	   uncertain	   and	   may	   take	   place	   only	   years	   in	   the	   future,	   while	   many	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  negative	   impacts	   (inundation	   of	   fragile	   ecosystems,	   displacement)	   take	   place	  immediately.	   The	   immediate	   negative	   impacts	   are	   more	   easily	   foreseeable	   than	  benefits,	  which	  are	  highly	  dependent	  on	  variable	  rainfall	  and	  climate	  patterns	  which	  fluctuate	  even	  more	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  global	  climate	  change.	   	   In	  view	  of	  this,	  one	  may	   argue	   that	   the	   analysis	   should	   be	   weighted	   more	   heavily	   towards	   the	   costs	  rather	  than	  the	  benefits.	  A	  more	  nuanced	  EIA	  that	  outlines	  various	  options	  and	  how	  to	   structure	   technical	   and	   policy	   options	   to	  maximize	   benefits	   and	  minimize	   cost	  and	  risk,	  is	  necessary.	  	   Social	  impact	  assessments	  are	  also	  important	  in	  ensuring	  the	  efficiency	  does	  not	   come	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   equity.	   Égré,	   Dominique,	   and	   Senécal,	   in	   a	   study	   of	   three	  large	   dams	   in	   China,	   Turkey,	   and	   Colombia;	   found	   the	   following	   key	   factors	   to	  mitigating	  the	  dam’s	  social	  costs	  and	  improving	  human	  outcomes	  after	  the	  project:	  conducting	   pre-­‐approval	   social	   impact	   assessments,	   cultivating	   trust	   and	   open	  communication,	  and	  incorporating	  a	  realistic	  resettlement	  action	  plan	  into	  the	  dam	  budget.	   They	   emphasized	   that	   any	   feasibility	   study	   must	   involve	   a	   ‘systematic	  comparison	   of	   project	   alternatives	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   technical,	   economic,	  environmental	  and	  social	  criteria	  through	  a	  participatory	  approach	  until	  an	  optimal	  balance	   of	   societal	   needs	   are	   achieved’	   (223).	   Reliable	   ground-­‐level	   data	   for	  environmental	  and	  social	  impact	  assessments	  needs	  to	  be	  collected	  prior	  to	  project	  decision,	  to	  avoid	  working	  based	  on	  assumptions.	  	  	   The	  difficulties	  of	  conducting	  cost	  benefit	  analyses	  on	  dams	  are	  compounded	  by	  ideological	  differences.	  	  There	  is	  little	  neutral	  ground	  in	  this	  debate.	  Some	  parties	  favor	   dam	   development	   under	   certain	   conditions	   while	   others	   reject	   dams	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  completely.	  Pro	  and	  anti-­‐dam	  establishments	  have	  both	  used	  their	  own	  methods	  of	  evaluating	   costs	   and	   benefits	   to	   come	   to	   conclusions	   that	   fit	   their	   view	   of	  development.	  	  	  
Scholarly	  Views	  on	  Dams	  	  	   The	  WCD	  assessed	  large	  dams	  based	  on	  their	  technical,	   financial,	  economic,	  environmental	   and	   social	   performance.	   The	   authors	   found	   that	   many	   large	   dams	  have	   not	   delivered	   their	   expected	   technical,	   financial	   and	   economic	   benefits,	   and	  imposed	   significant	   social	   and	   environmental	   impacts.	   These	   adverse	   effects	   have	  been	   disproportionately	   borne	   by	   the	   poorest	   and	  most	   vulnerable	   communities.	  They	  observe	  that	  as	  “the	  environmental	  and	  social	  costs	  of	   large	  dams	  have	  been	  poorly	   accounted	   for	   in	   economic	   terms,	   the	   true	   profitability	   of	   these	   schemes	  remains	  elusive”	  (xxxi).	  They	  also	  remark	  on	  the	  paucity	  of	  substantive	  evaluations	  of	  completed	  projects,	  criticizing	  them	  for	  having	  a	  “narrow	  scope,	  poor	  integration	  across	   impact	   categories	   and	   scales	   and	   [inadequate	   links]	   to	   decisions	   on	  operations”	   (xxxi).	   It	   takes	   a	   highly	   critical	   view	   of	   previous	   dams,	   indicting	   dam	  planners	   for	   the	   damaging	   effects	   that	   dams	   have	   imposed	   on	   the	   environment,	  livelihoods	  of	  affected	  communities,	  and	  cultural	  loss.	  Equity	  of	  benefit	  and	  cost	  is	  a	  deep	  concern,	  as	  those	  who	  benefited	  have	  not	  adequately	  compensated	  the	  parties	  with	  significant	  losses.	  	  In	  one	  sense,	  the	  WCD	  report	  emphasizes	  the	  humanitarian	  and	  environmental	  costs	  of	  dams	  more	  strongly	  than	  its	  economic	  inefficiencies.	  	  	  	   The	   authors’	   further	   demonstrate	   the	   WCD’s	   implicit	   anti-­‐dam	   stance	   by	  devoting	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  Report	  (“The	  Way	  Forward”)	  to	  examining	  past	  and	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  current	  alternatives	  to	  dams,	  particularly	  in	  regards	  to	  addressing	  global	  challenges	  for	  meeting	  the	  world’s	  energy	  and	  water	  needs.	  They	  emphasize	  that	  while	  the	  final	  decision	  is	  important,	  the	  process	  of	  planning,	  decision-­‐making	  and	  financing	  must	  involve	   a	   comprehensive	   and	   fair	   evaluation	   of	   all	   available	   options,	   including	  demand-­‐side	  management.	  	  	   The	   WCD	   advocates	   a	   rights-­‐and-­‐risks	   approach	   for	   equitable	   decision-­‐making.	  This	   is	   a	  negotiated	  approach	   that	   involves	   all	   parties,	   and	  where	  no	  one	  party’s	   right	   should	   take	  precedence	  over	  another’s.	  Cultural,	   social	   and	  economic	  rights	   should	   be	   recognized	   	   in	   addition	   to	   civil	   and	   political	   rights,	   within	   a	  framework	   where	   each	   party’s	   claims	   can	   be	   reviewed	   and	   negotiated.	   	   This	  approach	  attempts	  to	  correct	  the	  unequal	  burden	  of	  risk	  (WCD	  206).	  Dam	  building	  institutions	  take	  on	  financial	  risk	  voluntarily	  and	  can	  define	  the	  boundaries	  of	  their	  risk	   behavior,	   and	   this	   is	   usually	   the	   only	   risk	   that	   is	   taken	   into	   account	   in	   the	  project	   analysis.	  However,	   those	   affected	   by	   the	   dam	   take	   on	   far	   larger	   risks	   that	  directly	  affect	  their	  health,	  well-­‐being,	  community	  ties,	  economic	  security,	  and	  even	  their	   lives,	   often	   without	   consultation	   or	   consent.	   These	   involuntary	   risk	   bearers	  often	   have	   the	   least	   negotiating	   power	   and	   the	   least	   means	   of	   recourse	   when	  something	   goes	   wrong.	   If	   the	   good-­‐faith	   efforts	   of	   all	   parties	   fail	   to	   result	   in	   an	  agreement,	   alternative	   options	   should	   be	   considered	   or	   the	   project	   should	   go	   to	  arbitration.	  These	  decisions	  should	  abide	  by	  national	  legislation	  and	  constitution	  as	  well	  as	   international	  conventions,	  and	  citizens	  should	  retain	   the	  right	   to	  challenge	  decisions	  and	  seek	  reparations	  in	  court.	  	  	  
	  18	  	  	   Individual	  scholars	  in	  the	  emerging	  body	  of	  dam	  research	  have	  also	  laid	  forth	  their	   conclusions	   and	   philosophies	   on	   dam	   development.	   Scudder1,	   a	   foremost	  expert	  in	  dam	  resettlement	  who	  found	  that	  large	  dams	  in	  most	  cases	  were	  “part	  of	  a	  flawed	   paradigm	   that	   causes	   an	   increasing	   disconnection	   between	   the	   necessary	  environmental	   health	   of	   river	   basins	   and	   the	   current	   needs	   of	   people	   and	  governments	   for	   the	  provision	  of	  water,	   energy,	   and	   food”	   	   (16).	  Nevertheless,	   he	  still	  sees	  dams	  as	  a	  possible	  development	  option	  for	  governments	  when	  needs	  reach	  a	   crisis	   or	   near	   crisis	   proportion	   in	   developing	   countries.	   He	   suggests	   a	  participatory	   options	   assessment	   process	   to	   maximize	   and	   allow	   an	   equitable	  distribution	  of	  benefits,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  minimize	  losses.	  	  	   Biswas2,	   a	  water	   policy	   expert,	   believes	   that	   the	   polarized	   debate	   on	   dams	  needs	  to	  be	  refocused	  to	  consider	  the	  overall	  goals	  of	  water	  development	  (16).	  He	  strongly	   objects	   to	   primarily	  Western-­‐based	  NGOs	   intervening	   in	   dam	   projects	   in	  developing	  countries,	  asserting	  that	  a	  decision	  to	  build	  a	  dam	  should	  be	  their	  own,	  not	  be	  imposed	  on	  them	  by	  Western	  activists	  in	  a	  neocolonialist	  fashion	  or	  even	  by	  urban	   decision-­‐makers	   outside	   the	   region.	   	   He	   concludes	   that	   the	   external	   and	  internal	   forces	   governing	   the	   circumstances	   under	   which	   a	   country	   decides	   on	   a	  water	   management	   solution	   are	   so	   complex	   that	   no	   blanket	   prescription	   would	  work	  for	  every	  case,	  and	  dams	  should	  not	  be	  dismissed	  a	  priori	  before	  an	  objective	  and	  honest	  discussion	  about	  its	  trade	  offs.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Thayer	  Scudder,	  an	  anthropologist	  who	  served	  as	  a	  Commissioner	  on	  the	  World	  Commission	  on	  Dams,	  who	  has	  consulted	  for	  several	  dam	  projects	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  as	  well	  as	  provided	  material	  to	  the	  International	  Rivers	  Network,	  is	  often	  regarded	  the	  world’s	  foremost	  expert	  on	  dam-­‐induced	  resettlement.	  Having	  researched	  and	  written	  on	  dams	  for	  over	  50	  years,	  his	  stance	  has	  changed	  from	  being	  a	  supporter	  of	  large	  dams	  to	  a	  more	  nuanced	  stance.	  2	  Asit	  Biswas	  is	  founder	  and	  director	  of	  the	  Third	  World	  Centre	  for	  Water	  Management	  in	  Mexico	  and	  a	  water	  policy	  expert.	  	  	  
	  19	  	  	   Patrick	   McCully,	   a	   leading	   figure	   in	   the	   anti-­‐dam	   movement,	   holds	   an	  opposing	   view.	  3 	  He	   disagrees	   completely	   with	   the	   likes	   of	   Biswas	   and	   other	  proponents	  of	  large	  dams,	  calling	  the	  World	  Water	  Council	  that	  Biswas	  co-­‐founded	  the	  ‘water	  mafia’.	  In	  his	  popular	  manifesto	  “Silenced	  Rivers:	  The	  Ecology	  and	  Politics	  of	  Large	  Dams”,	  Patrick	  McCully	  documents	  the	  tremendous	  hidden	  costs	  that	  dams	  have	   imposed	   on	   society,	   and	   faults	   the	   trifecta	   of	   development	   agencies	  (particularly	   the	  World	  Bank),	   governments,	   and	  dam	   construction	   companies	   for	  massive	   human	   suffering,	   irreversible	   ecological	   damage,	   and	   impending	  environmental	   disaster.	   He	   contends	   that	   the	   benefits	   of	   dams	   have	   been	  exaggerated,	   and	   could	   often	   have	   been	   produced	   by	   other	   less	   destructive	   and	  more	  equitable	  means	  (xv).	  	  	   Examining	   previous	   evaluations	   of	   dams	   can	   provide	   a	   clearer	   picture	   of	  whether	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  have	  been	  properly	  accounted	  for.	  This	  can	  help	  to	  determine	   in	   retrospect	   whether	   a	   particular	   dam	   was	   a	   good	   investment	   for	   a	  country.	  While	  there	  are	  many	  interconnections	  between	  all	  aspects	  of	  a	  dam,	  I	  have	  separated	   these	   evaluations	   into	   three	   aspects:	   financial	   and	   economic,	  environmental	  and	  social	  impacts.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  Patrick	  McCully	  is	  also	  the	  former	  Executive	  Director	  of	  International	  Rivers	  Network,	  the	  leading	  non-­‐governmental	  organization	  dedicated	  to	  preserving	  rivers	  and	  campaigning	  against	  dams.	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Chapter	  2:	  Evaluations	  of	  Dams’	  Performance	  Globally	  
	  
Where’s	  the	  Money	  Going?	  Financial	  and	  economic	  performance	  of	  dams	  	   Financial	  performance	  for	  	  dams	  in	  producing	  hydropower	  can	  be	  measured	  in	   two	   ways;	   by	   comparing	   the	   cost	   of	   hydropower	   dams	   with	   other	   options	  (essentially	   calculating	   the	  opportunity	   cost	  of	  hydropower),	   or	  by	   calculating	   the	  estimated	  internal	  rate	  of	  return	  (EIRR)	  on	  a	  dam	  project.	  These	  different	  methods	  of	  cost	  calculation	  do	  not	  line	  up	  neatly	  for	  comparison,	  as	  the	  first	  method	  is	  a	  more	  theoretical	   options-­‐assessment	   that	   makes	   many	   assumptions	   about	   carrying	  capacity,	   load,	   water	   volumes	   and	   so	   on.	   It	   also	   assumes	   away	   the	   initial	   cost	   of	  construction,	   a	   very	   substantial	   assumption	   as	   80%	   of	   the	   cost	   for	   hydropower	  generation	  is	  the	  capital	  cost	  of	  dam	  construction	  (McCully	  269).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  done	  properly	  it	  gives	  a	  better	  context	  to	  judge	  dams’	  performance,	  as	  alternative	  options	  may	  come	  with	  huge	  costs	  (eg.	  coal	  despite	  its	  low	  private	  costs,	  comes	  with	  high	  health	   costs)	   hydropower	  may	  prove	   to	   be	  best	   solution	   in	   final	   analyses.	   In	  comparison,	   the	   EIRR	   measures	   costs	   incurred	   over	   the	   duration	   of	   dam	  construction,	  incorporating	  unplanned	  expenses	  such	  as	  cost	  overruns,	  time	  delays,	  corruption,	  maintenance	  and	  repair	  costs;	  and	  balances	  it	  with	  the	  realized	  benefits	  from	  the	  dam.	  	  	   I	  calculated	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  hydropower	  dams	  using	  data	  from	  MIT’s	  Center	   of	   Energy	   and	   Environmental	   Policy	   Research	   as	   well	   as	   the	   U.S.	   Energy	  Information	   Administration	   (EIA).	   This	   data	   compares	   the	   cost	   of	   electricity	  generation	  with	  existing	  hydropower	  facilities	  in	  the	  United	  States	  to	  other	  forms	  of	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  electricity	  generation	   (including	  nuclear	  energy,	   traditional	   coal-­‐firing	  and	  natural	  gas).	   Greenstone	   and	   Looney	   divided	   total	   costs	   into	   private	   costs	   and	   external	  costs;	  and	   found	  that	  existing	  nuclear	  energy	  was	   the	  cheapest	  option	  at	  2.2	  cents	  per	  kwh,	  with	  the	  next	  cheapest	  option	  being	  existing	  hydropower	  at	  6.4	  cents	  per	  kwh	  (2012).	  The	  EIA	  estimation	  included	  new	  generation	  resources	  coming	  online	  in	  2017,	  and	  found	  natural	  gas	  to	  have	  the	  lowest	   levelized	  cost	  at	  6.31-­‐6.91	  cents	  per	  kwh,	  while	  hydropower	  had	  the	  next	  lowest	  levelized	  cost	  at	  8.89	  cents	  per	  kwh	  (EIA	  2012).4	  	  	   From	  this	  cursory	  inspection	  it	  appears	  that	  hydropower	  is	  a	  relatively	  cheap	  electricity	  generating	  option.	  However,	  there	  are	  certain	  important	  caveats	  to	  these	  calculations.	  The	  biggest	  one	  is	  the	  costs	  for	  generation	  of	  electrical	  power	  depend	  on	  the	  country’s	  natural	  resource	  endowments	  and	  technological	  advancement,	  and	  its	  relative	  ability	  to	  use	  and	  transport	  these	  resources	  efficiently.	  In	  addition,	  these	  options	  are	  not	  available	   to	  all	   countries,	  of	  which	   the	  clearest	  example	   is	  nuclear	  plant	  power,	  which	  is	  exploited	  in	  less	  than	  30%	  of	  the	  world’s	  nations.	  	  	   The	   validity	   of	   the	   calculation	   is	   also	   affected	   by	   temporal	   dislocation	   as	  electricity	  generation	  technology	  has	  advanced	  significantly	  over	  the	  last	  fifty	  years.	  Older	  dams	  built	  in	  the	  pre-­‐war	  period	  generate	  less	  electricity	  than	  new	  dams	  due	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  sedimentation,	  and	  their	  less	  efficient	  design	  and	  technology.	  	   There	  is	  tremendous	  hope	  in	  the	  rise	  of	  clean	  alternative	  energy	  sources	  that	  avoid	  many	  of	  the	  adverse	  effects	  of	  hydropower.	  However,	  ‘clean’	  energies	  such	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Levelized	  cost	  is	  defined	  in	  the	  paper	  as	  the	  cost	  of	  building	  and	  operating	  a	  generalizing	  plant	  over	  an	  assumed	  financial	  life	  and	  duty	  cycle.	  It	  takes	  into	  account	  overnight	  capital	  costs,	  fuel	  costs,	  operation	  costs,	  financing	  costs	  and	  an	  assumed	  utilization	  rate	  for	  each	  plant	  type.	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  wind	   (9.6	   cents	   per	   kwh)	   and	   solar	   power	   (15.2-­‐24.2	   cents	   per	   kwh)	   have	   not	  achieved	   the	   technological	   and	   scale	   efficiencies	   to	   be	   a	   competitive	   renewable	  alternative	   to	   hydropower.	   Hydropower	   remains	   an	   established	   technology	   that	  generates	   electricity	   at	   low	   cost	   for	   a	   long	   time	   period	   after	   construction.	   When	  evaluating	  the	  optimal	  power	  generation	  mix	  for	  countries,	  hydropower	  (though	  not	  necessarily	  large	  dams)	  may	  still	  provide	  the	  best	  possible	  solution.	  	  	   The	  financial	  performance	  of	  dams	  built	  for	  other	  purposes	  such	  as	  irrigation,	  water	   storage,	   safety	  and	  multi-­‐purpose	  dams	  can	  be	  measured	  by	  calculating	   the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  dam	  has	  been	  able	  to	  achieve	  its	  stated	  goals;	  both	  quantitative	  (agricultural	  production	  targets)	  and	  qualitative	  (flood	  protection,	  increased	  trade).	  	  	  	   In	   the	  WCD	   assessment	   of	   dams’	   financial	   performance,	   one-­‐quarter	   of	   the	  dams	  achieved	   less	   than	  planned	  capital	   cost	   targets,	  but	  almost	   three-­‐quarters	  of	  the	   dams	   experienced	   capital	   cost	   overruns.	   16%	   of	   the	   dams	   cost	   over	   twice	   as	  much	  as	  planned	  (39).	  A	  World	  Bank	  study	  compared	  hydropower	  projects	  between	  1965	   and	   1986	   to	   other	   development	   projects,	   and	   found	   that	   the	   average	   cost	  overrun	   for	   hydropower	   projects	   were	   on	   average	   27%,	   compared	   with	   6%	   for	  thermal	  power	  projects	  and	  11%	  for	  2,000	  other	  development	  projects	  (WCD	  41).	  	  	   These	  numbers	   suggest	   that	  while	   there	   is	   a	   tendency	   for	   large	  projects	   to	  overrun	   their	   initial	   budgets,	   dams	   fare	  worse	   even	   among	  development	  projects.	  The	  regional	  variation	  in	  cost	  overruns	  was	  also	  significant	  —	  53%	  in	  Latin	  America,	  69%	   in	   Europe,	   108%	   in	   Central	   Asia,	   and	   138%	   in	   South	   Asia	   (WCD	   40).	   This	  suggests	  a	  failure	  of	  governance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  dam	  authorities.	  Much	  of	  these	  cost	  overruns	   are	   blamed	   on	   time	   delays	   due	   to	   the	   discovery	   of	   less	   favorable	   site	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  conditions	  and	  opposition	  to	  the	  dam.	  However,	  this	  points	  to	  a	  deeper	  problem	  of	  poor	  development	  of	   technical	  and	  cost	  estimates	  of	  dams.	  These	  estimates	   fail	   to	  factor	  in	  realistic	  delays	  and	  resettlement	  costs,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  costs	  of	  poor	  planning	  by	   suppliers	   and	   contractors.	   These	   delays	   and	   cost	   overruns	   delay	   revenue	  generation,	   increase	   interest	   payments,	   and	   affect	   delivery	   of	   services,	   causing	   a	  dampening	  effect	  on	  net	  benefit.	  	  	   Almost	   half	   of	   the	   dams	   in	   the	   WCD	   Knowledge	   Base	   fell	   short	   of	   their	  irrigation	  target,	  mostly	  during	  the	  first	  five	  years	  of	  project	  life.	  However,	  there	  is	  high	  variability,	  with	  50%	  achieving	  or	  exceeding	   their	   targets	   (WCD	  43).	   Smaller	  dams	   tend	   to	   perform	   closer	   to	   the	   predicted	   targets,	   while	   all	   the	   dams	   that	  performed	  below	  90%	  of	  their	  targets	  were	  large	  dams	  (WCD	  44).	  In	  cases	  of	  dams	  successfully	  meeting	  their	  irrigation	  targets,	  estimation	  of	  dam	  effect	  is	  fraught	  with	  difficulty	   due	   to	   the	   presence	   of	   confounding	   factors.	   Farmers	   may	   change	   the	  cropping	   pattern,	   from	   staple	   crops	   to	   high-­‐value	   crops,	   as	   in	   Aslantas	   Dam	   in	  Turkey.	  This	  switch	  to	  high-­‐value	  crops	  increased	  the	  monetary	  value	  of	  agricultural	  production	  (WCD	  44).	  Improved	  varieties,	  mechanization	  and	  other	  yield-­‐increasing	  technology	  may	  also	  result	  in	  increased	  yields,	  which	  makes	  it	  impossible	  to	  isolate	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  dam.	  It	  may	  be	  argued,	  however,	  that	  these	  are	  all	  multiplier	  effects	  attributable	   to	   the	  dam	  as	   these	  developments	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  without	   the	  dam’s	  supply	  of	  water.	  	  	   	  
Environmental	  Performance	  of	  Dams	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   Dams	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   the	   natural	   flow	   of	   rivers,	   an	   important	   part	   of	   a	   dynamic	  ecosystem.	   	   This	  monumental	   change	   in	   the	  natural	   environment	   cannot	   help	   but	  have	  unexpected,	  and	  often	  adverse,	  effects	  on	  its	  other	  moving	  parts.	  Occasionally	  they	  bring	  about	  unexpected	  benefits,	  such	  as	  large	  dams	  in	  South	  Africa	  that	  have	  become	   important	   dry-­‐season	   and	   drought	   refuges	   for	   waterfowl.	   Unfortunately,	  67%	   of	   the	   ecosystem	   impacts	   are	   negative,	   as	   found	   in	   the	   WCD’s	   Cross	   Check	  Survey	  (93).	  	  	   Until	   the	   1970s,	   the	   environmental	   effects	   of	   dams	   were	   not	   considered	  when	  evaluating	  projects.	  Since	  then,	  environmental	  impact	  analyses	  have	  become	  a	  standard	   procedure	   in	   dam	   approval,	   yet	   according	   to	   the	  WCD’s	   evaluation,	   the	  efforts	   to	   counter	   the	   ecosystem	   impacts	   of	   large	   dams	   have	   only	   partially	  succeeded.	  To	  a	   large	  extent	   this	   is	  due	   to	   the	   shoddy	  effort	   in	  understanding	   the	  ecosystem	   and	   the	   possible	   impacts,	   the	   inadequate	   approach	   to	   assessing	   even	  anticipated	  impacts,	  and	  only	  partial	  success	  in	  mitigation.	  	  	   The	   World	   Commission	   on	   Dams	   separates	   ecosystem	   impacts	   into	   first-­‐,	  second-­‐	  and	  third-­‐order:	  first	  order	  being	  physical,	  chemical	  and	  geo-­‐morphological	  consequences	   of	   altering	   a	   river’s	   flow,	   second	   order	   being	   changes	   in	   primary	  biological	   productivity	   of	   ecosystems,	   and	   third	   order	   being	   impacts	   that	   involve	  alterations	   to	   fauna	   due	   to	   a	   first	   or	   second	   order	   effects	   (74).	   Finally,	   larger	  biochemical	  changes	  in	  the	  natural	  riverine	  system	  causing	  emissions	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  are	  also	  assessed.	  However,	  as	  explained	  in	  the	  literature	  review	  portion,	  the	  irreversible	   nature	   of	   many	   ecosystem	   impacts	   makes	   it	   difficult	   to	   accurately	  assess	  or	  quantify	  its	  benefits	  or	  losses.	  For	  instance,	  the	  loss	  of	  biodiversity	  through	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  the	  extinction	  of	  yet-­‐undiscovered	  plant	  and	  animal	  species	  in	  riverine	  systems	  and	  pristine	  rainforests,	   is	  a	   loss	  to	  the	  world	  that	   is	   impossible	  to	  quantify	  (it	  may	  be	  quantified,	  but	  outside	  verification	  is	  by	  definition	  impossible).	  	  	   By	   damming	   the	   natural	   river	   flow,	   communities	   can	   become	   more	  vulnerable	   to	   environmental	   shocks	   than	   before.	   Dam	   overtopping	   can	   cause	  devastating	   human	   losses,	   such	   as	   when	   two	   dams	   burst	   in	   Henan,	   China,	  overwhelming	  villages	  at	  nearly	  50	  kilometers	  an	  hour.	  	  According	  to	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  an	  estimated	  85,000	  died	  in	  the	  immediate	  flood,	  and	  another	  145,000	  in	  the	  epidemics	  in	  the	  ensuing	  weeks	  (Scudder	  115-­‐117).	  This	  potential	  risk	  should	  also	  be	  included	  in	  the	  cost-­‐benefit	  calculations,	  as	  the	  appearance	  of	  flood	  control	  and	  safety	  encourages	  higher	  population	  density	  at	  the	  base	  of	  the	  dam,	  which	  can	  lead	  to	  disastrous	  results	  if	  the	  dams	  overtopped.	  	  	   Dams	  also	  decimate	  fish	  stock	  (85).	  This	  devastates	  livelihoods	  of	  fishermen	  who	  depend	  on	  river	  fish	  for	  their	  income	  as	  well	  as	  low-­‐income	  river	  communities	  that	   depend	   on	   the	   river’s	   abundance	   for	  most	   of	   their	   protein.	   The	   low-­‐mineral	  quality	  of	  dam	  water	  (as	  opposed	  to	  natural	  flooding,	  which	  flushes	  down	  minerals	  and	   soil	   along	   with	   the	   water,	   creating	   richer	   soil)	   can	   also	   lead	   to	   reduced	  agricultural	  fertility,	  which	  leads	  to	  lower	  productivity	  and	  an	  increased	  reliance	  on	  commercial	  fertilizer.	  	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  climate	  change	  creates	  opportunities	   for	  using	  dams	  for	  flood	   control	   and	   water	   storage	   to	   bring	   a	   measure	   of	   stability,	   essential	   for	  economic	   development,	   in	   areas	   that	   have	   seen	   increasing	   volatility	   in	   snowmelt	  and	  rainfall.	  This	   is	  the	  case	  in	  areas	  of	  Latin	  America	  where	  the	  snowmelt	  caused	  
	  26	  	  by	   global	  warming	  has	   created	   a	   need	   for	   reservoirs	   or	   other	  water	  management	  systems	  to	  eliminate	  flooding.	  	  	   Overall,	   analyzing	   the	   ecosystem	   effects	   of	   dams	   is	   made	   difficult	   by	   a	  combination	  of	  changing	  weather	  patterns,	  global	  warming,	  and	  a	   lack	  of	  research	  especially	   in	   tropical	   regions	   where	   most	   of	   the	   dam-­‐building	   activity	   has	   been	  centered	  since	  the	  1970s.	  There	  is	  a	  high	  need	  for	  more	  studies	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  ecosystem	  effects	  that	  dams	  are	  having	  on	  our	  environment	  and	  our	  future.	  	  	  
Social	  Performance	  of	  Dams	  	   The	  impact	  of	  dams	  on	  people	  and	  society	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  contested	  and	  researched	   effect	   of	   dams.	   The	   strong	   activism	   levied	   against	   dam-­‐building	   by	  human	   rights	   activists	   is	   a	   result	   of	   the	   devastating	   effect	   of	   failed	   dams	   on	  vulnerable	  communities	  today	  and	  in	  the	  past.	  The	  human	  costs	  of	  dams	  range	  from	  the	  most	  direct,	  property	   loss	  due	  to	  submergence	  by	  the	  reservoir,	  and	  extend	  to	  loss	   of	   economic	   livelihood	   due	   to	   displacement,	   break-­‐up	   of	   community	   and	   its	  resulting	   negative	   effects,	   a	   loss	   of	   culture	   and	   identity,	   deterioration	   in	   health	  (especially	   the	   reservoir-­‐related	   spread	   of	   schistosomiasis,	   a	   devastating	   water-­‐borne	   disease	   parasite	   that	   thrives	   near	   dams),	   and	   social	   marginalization	   and	  conflict	   in	   the	  resettled	  area.	  These	  effects	  continue	   for	  generations,	  and	  often	   the	  affected	  peoples	  cannot	  recover	  their	  previous	  standard	  of	  living.	  	  	   Thayer	   Scudder’s	   research	   on	   dam-­‐induced	   resettlement	   underlines	   the	  severity	   of	   this	   problem.	   Of	   the	   44	   large	   dams	   he	   surveyed,	   only	   three	   of	   the	  resettled	  populations	  of	   those	  dams	  had	   improved	   their	   living	   standards,	   and	   five	  
	  27	  	  others	   had	   restored	   them.	  The	   other	   36	   populations	   experienced	  worsened	   living	  standards	  after	  resettlement	  (Scudder	  61).	  	  	   These	  costs	  are	  disproportionately	  borne	  by	  the	  poorest	  and	  most	  vulnerable	  sector	  of	  society,	  the	  indigenous	  people	  who	  sustain	  themselves	  from	  the	  richness	  of	  river	  basins	   and	   forests	   as	  well	   as	   rural	   farmers	  who	  have	   little	  or	  no	   integration	  into	   the	   cash	   economy.	   In	   addition,	   the	   promised	   benefits	   of	   increased	   irrigation,	  electricity,	   flood	   control,	   tourism	   and	   reservoir	   fishing	   have	   often	   been	   diverted	  away	  from	  these	  sectors	  most	  impacted	  by	  the	  dam.	  	  	   There	   has	   been	   very	   little	   investigation	   on	   the	   economic	   impact	   of	   social	  costs.	  One	  of	  the	  obvious	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  current	  options	  evaluation	  process	  is	  measuring	   value	   gained	   or	   lost	   simply	   by	   measuring	   the	   change	   in	   income	   or	  compensation	  with	  land	  or	  cash.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  losses	  or	  gains	  must	  be	  quantified	  or	   the	   cost	   benefit	   analysis	   will	   naturally	   be	   skewed	   toward	   the	   highest	   income	  producing	  uses	  like	  hydroelectricity	  rather	  than	  the	  less	  tangible	  benefits	  of	  culture	  preservation,	  environmental	  protection	  and	  biodiversity.	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  the	  dam	  cost	   projections	   must	   include	   adequate	   (the	   WCD	   recommends	   generous)	  compensation,	   and	   provisions	   for	   development	   opportunities	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	  welfare	   of	   resettled	   populations	   is	   improved	   through	   the	   dam.	   While	   there	   is	   a	  measure	  of	  uncertainty,	  the	  total	  costs	  for	  resettlement	  are	  not	  difficult	  to	  calculate.	  The	   hesitation	   to	   do	   so	   usually	   stems	   from	   the	   unpleasant	   fact	   that	   a	   complete	  accounting	   reduces	   the	   return	   on	   investment	   for	   the	   project.	   	   When	   it	   is	   in	   the	  interest	   of	   state	   officials,	   dam	   building	   consultancies	   and	   funding	   agencies	   to	   get	  projects	  approved,	  these	  costs	  can	  easily	  be	  manipulated	  to	  show	  a	  positive	  return.	  	  
	  28	  	  	   Michael	   Cernea,	   in	   his	   risks	   and	   reconstruction	   model,	   points	   out	   that	  conventional	  risk	  analysis	  calculates	   the	  risk	   taken	  by	  capital	  shareholders,	  due	  to	  the	   government	   taking	   steps	   to	   provide	   guarantees,	   but	   the	   high	   risks	   borne	   by	  resettlers	   is	   not	   in	   this	   equation	  despite	   them	  having	   the	  most	   to	   lose.	  He	   argued	  that	   risk	   analysis	   for	   dam	   projects	   had	   to	   ‘recognize	   risk	   distribution	   among	   all	  project	  actors	  and	  address	  equitably	  the	  direct	  risks	  to	  area	  people	  as	  well’	  (Cernea	  1581).	  	  	   Scudder,	  Cernea,	  and	  other	  experts	  in	  the	  field	  caution	  that	  resettlement	  may	  be	   too	   complex	   a	   process	   for	   project	   authorities	   to	  manage	   successful	   outcomes.	  Hence,	   project	   authorities	   should	   preferentially	   select	   options	   that	   minimize	   or	  avoid	   involuntary	   resettlement,	   and	   this	   has	   been	   incorporated	   into	  World	   Bank	  resettlement	  guidelines.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  trend	  of	  building	  large	  dams	  has	  gone	  in	  the	   opposite	   direction,	   with	   two	   of	   the	   largest	   dam-­‐building	   countries,	   India	   and	  China,	   building	   dams	   on	   major	   rivers	   that	   will	   displace	   upwards	   of	   one	   million	  people.	  	  	  	   There	   are	   also	   many	   social	   benefits	   that	   are	   directly	   attributable	   to	   dam	  development	   including	   reservoir	   tourism,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   intended	   benefits	   of	  increased	   incomes	   to	   downstream	   farmers,	   stable	   electricity,	   and	   flood	   control.	  However,	  as	  previously	  discussed,	   these	  benefits	   from	  dams	  are	  difficult	   to	   isolate	  and	   have	   been	   poorly	   studied,	   not	   to	   mention	   highly	   prone	   to	   capture	   by	   well-­‐connected	  elites,	  as	  shown	  in	  many	  cases	  in	  India	  of	  reservoir	  fishing	  licenses	  being	  given	  to	  contractors	  from	  outside	  the	  catchment	  area.	  On	  the	  whole,	  these	  benefits	  
	  29	  	  have	  not	  benefitted	   the	   intended	   recipients	   as	  much	  as	  hoped,	   and	   in	  many	   cases	  worsened	  their	  living	  conditions	  and	  narrowed	  their	  opportunities.	  	  	  
Dam	  Cost	  Benefit	  Analysis	  	  	   The	  capital	  expenditure	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  dams	  is	  frequently	  funded	  by	  loans	   from	   development	   agencies	   and	   banks.	   The	   criteria	   for	   loan	   approval	   has	  historically	   been	   tied	   to	   a	   certain	   economic	   internal	   rate	   of	   return	   (EIRR)	   and	  financial	   internal	  rate	  of	  return	  (FIRR).	  These	  are	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  economic	  return	   to	   the	   country	   and	   the	   profitability	   to	   the	   project	   funder	   respectively,	   and	  have	  traditionally	  been	  determined	  with	  cost-­‐benefit	  analyses.	  	  	   WCD	   figures	   show	   an	   average	   of	   10.5%	   economic	   internal	   rate	   return	   on	  fourteen	  projects	  funded	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  Asian	  Development	  Bank	  (47).	   In	  the	  WCD	   evaluation	   studies	   of	   nine	   large	   dams,	   only	   one	   project,	   Tucurui	  Dam	   in	  Brazil,	   failed	   to	  meet	   targets	   by	   a	   significant	   amount	   (56).	   In	   this	   dam,	   the	   large	  subsidies	  to	  industry	  and	  the	  operating	  facility	  as	  well	  as	  large	  cost	  overruns	  during	  the	  building	  process	  eroded	  any	  competitive	  advantage	  the	  dam	  had	  in	  producing	  a	  cheap	  source	  of	  hydroelectricity.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  failure	  of	  government	  is	  especially	  apparent	   as	   there	   were	   little	   efforts	   to	   aim	   for	   economic	   profitability	   or	   cost	  recovery	  in	  the	  planning	  process.	  	  	   Due	  to	  the	  low	  reliability	  and	  availability	  of	  official	  project	  appraisals	  and	  the	  lack	  of	   long-­‐term	  studies	  on	  dams’	   economic	   returns,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	   say	  whether	  dams	   have	   created	   positive	   financial	   and	   economic	   return	   on	   average.	   There	   are	  
	  30	  	  also	  significant	  problems	  with	  using	  pre-­‐project	  cost-­‐benefit	  analyses	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  evaluating	  a	  project’s	  return.	  	  	   First,	  cost-­‐benefit	  analyses	  are	  not	  always	  done	  before	  a	  project	  and	  are	  often	  done	   ex-­‐post	   to	   justify	   the	   cost	   of	   a	   project.	   The	   World	   Bank’s	   1991	   review	  highlighted	  that	  it	  is	  ‘common	  practice	  when	  bureaucrats	  propose	  water	  projects	  in	  India	  to	  ensure	  project	  acceptance	  by	  inflating	  benefits	  and	  underestimating	  costs’	  (World	  Bank	  22).	  Second,	  cost-­‐benefit	  analyses	  often	  only	  account	  for	  a	  small	  set	  of	  economic	  costs	  and	  benefits.	  For	  example,	   cost	  overruns	  due	   to	  project	  delays	  are	  often	  not	  budgeted	  for	  in	  the	  project.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  cost	  of	  resettlement	  for	  affected	   communities	   is	   also	   often	   not	   included	   in	   the	   costs,	   and	   even	  when	   it	   is;	  little	  effort	   is	  made	  to	  seriously	  consider	  compensation	  that	  goes	  beyond	  the	  price	  of	   land	  and	  new	  housing.	  Other	  long-­‐term	  costs	  such	  as	  economic	  schemes	  to	  help	  the	   livelihood	   of	   the	   dispossessed	   are	   not	   included	   into	   cost	   calculations.	  Environmental	  destruction	  to	  the	  area	  is	  also	  not	  quantified	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  efforts	  to	  mitigate	  the	  damage	  not	  included	  in	  the	  budget.	  	  	   Almost	   no	   cost-­‐benefit	   analyses	   include	   the	   projected	   cost	   of	  decommissioning,	   the	   inclusion	  of	  which	   is	   standard	   in	   the	  nuclear	  plant	   industry	  (McCully	  127).	  When	  the	  costs	  of	  maintaining	  a	  dam	  exceed	  the	  benefits	  generated	  from	  its	  use,	  or	   the	  aging	  plant	  becomes	  a	  safety	  hazard	  to	  nearby	  dwellers,	  plans	  must	   be	   made	   on	   how	   to	   repair	   or	   decommission	   it.	   These	   costs,	   in	   addition	   to	  lifetime	  maintenance	   and	   repair	   costs,	   are	  not	   always	   included	   in	   the	   cost-­‐benefit	  analyses.	  	  
	  31	  	  	   From	   an	   economic	   standpoint,	   the	   other	   missing	   component	   from	   cost-­‐benefit	  analyses	  is	  a	  comprehensive	  evaluation	  of	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  dams.	  Due	  to	   the	   significant	   capital	   expenditure	   (ranging	   from	  a	  million	   to	   tens	  of	  billions	  of	  dollars)	  required,	  a	  dam	  is	  a	  large	  and	  potentially	  risky	  investment	  for	  any	  country.	  Dams	   involve	   significant	   upfront	   cost,	   years	   or	   even	   decades	   of	   building	   with	   no	  revenue	  generation,	  and	  a	  long	  repayment	  period	  that	  can	  tie	  up	  a	  country’s	  budget,	  all	   while	   providing	   no	   guarantee	   of	   future	   benefits.	   With	   the	   high	   capital	   cost	  necessitating	   large	   loans	   from	   development	   agencies	   and	   banks,	   countries	   are	  vulnerable	  to	  currency	  devaluation	  and	  interest	  rate	  fluctuation.	  	  	   Other	   development	   needs,	   such	   as	   sanitation,	   education,	   roads	   and	   health	  provision,	  are	  less	  glamorous	  and	  flashy	  than	  a	  dam,	  but	  may	  nevertheless	  generate	  a	  higher	  economic	  return	  and	  spur	  development	  in	  an	  impoverished	  region.	  These	  options	   need	   to	   be	   given	   equal	   consideration	   besides	   dams.	   With	   regard	   to	   the	  function	   of	   dams,	   other	   options	   such	   as	   watershed	   management,	   smaller	   flood	  control	   or	   irrigation	   structures,	   and	   other	   electricity-­‐generating	   options	   such	   as	  natural	  gas	  and	  solar	  ought	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  well.	  	  	   On	  the	  benefits	  side,	  the	  WCD	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  multiplier	  effects	  from	  a	  dam	  is	  difficult	  to	  foresee	  and	  has	  not	  been	  adequate	  studied.	  Rita	  Cessti	  and	  R.P.S	  Malik	  examined	  the	  indirect	  economic	  impacts	  of	  three	  dams:	  Bhakra	  Dam	  in	  India,	  High	  Aswan	  Dam	  in	  Egypt,	  and	  Sobradinho	  Dam	  and	  Reservoirs	  in	  Brazil	  (19).	  Using	  different	  input/output	  models,	  they	  calculated	  several	  scenarios	  to	  find	  the	  regional	  value	  add	  or	  income	  multiplier	  values	  with	  and	  without	  a	  dam.	  In	  all	  cases,	  the	  net	  effect	   on	   income	   was	   a	   positive	   multiplier;	   as	   agricultural	   productivity	   and	   area	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  increased,	   stable	   electricity	   was	   made	   available	   to	   rural	   households,	   and	   flood	  control	  was	  implemented.	  These	  have	  led	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  income,	  particularly	  for	  the	  poorest	  households.	  However,	  by	  only	  assessing	  changes	  in	  income,	  they	  failed	  to	  account	  for	  other	  costs	  that	  the	  dams	  bring,	  including,	  increasing	  soil	  exhaustion	  and	   salinity,	   a	   decline	   in	   shrimp	   and	   sardine	   fish	   catch,	   and	   an	   increase	   in	  schistosomiasis,	  and	  degradation	  of	  formerly	  cultivated	  land	  in	  the	  High	  Aswan	  Dam,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  displacement	  and	  poorly-­‐planned	  resettlement	  of	  25,000	  people	  in	  the	  Sobradinho	  Dam.	  Hence,	  the	  multiplier	  effects	  on	  income	  do	  not	  necessarily	  capture	  the	   full	   range	  of	  benefits	   and	   costs	   (particularly	  non-­‐monetary	   changes	   caused	  by	  the	  dam)	  that	  dams	  bring.	  	   Esther	  Duflo	  and	  Rohini	  Pande’s	  paper	  “Dams”	  examined	  the	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  and	  costs	  of	  dams.	   It	  examined	  the	  correlation	  between	  dams	  and	  income	  across	   different	   states	   in	   India,	   and	   showed	   a	   redistribution	   of	   benefits	   from	  catchment	   area	   (upstream)	   farmers	   to	   downstream	   farmers.	   There	   was	   a	   slight	  decline	   in	   poverty	   for	   downstream	   farmers,	   but	   a	   large	   increase	   in	   poverty	  upstream	  as	  farmers	  are	  forced	  out	  of	  productive	  lands	  to	  less	  productive	  areas.	  In	  addition,	   they	   found	   that	   “in	   areas	   where	   the	   institutional	   structure	   favors	   the	  politically	  and	  economically	  advantaged,	  dams	  cause	  a	  greater	  increase	  in	  poverty”	  (640).	  With	   a	   development	   project	  where	   the	  most	   advantaged	   groups	   can	   easily	  capture	   the	   benefits	  while	   the	  poor	   bear	   the	   brunt	   of	   the	   costs,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  examine	  closely	  the	  equity	  effects	  on	  society.	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   Thus	   far,	   I	   have	   attempted	   to	   analyze	   dams’	   benefits	   and	   costs	   neutrally.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  larger	  political	  and	  economic	  system	  in	  which	  these	  projects	  are	  created	  and	  realized,	  which	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  politics	  of	  dam	  building.	  	  	   As	  previously	  discussed,	  the	  WCD	  failed	  to	  bring	  all	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  dam	  industry	   to	   consensus.	   Anti-­‐dam	   activists	   believe	   the	   WCD	   did	   not	   put	   enough	  emphasis	  on	  alternative	  water	  management	  solutions	  or	  seek	  sufficient	  engagement	  with	   the	   World	   Bank	   to	   create	   greater	   impact,	   while	   the	   dam	   industry	   and	   the	  largest	  dam	  building	  countries	  see	  the	  WCD	  as	  unfairly	  critical	  of	  dams	  by	  not	  doing	  enough	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  great	  importance	  dams	  play	  in	  a	  nation’s	  development.	  The	  WCD	   and	   anti-­‐dam	  movement	   has	   also	   been	   criticized	   as	   being	   hypocritical,	  since	   the	   largely	   first-­‐world	   activists	   have	   the	   luxury	   of	   preaching	   the	   anti-­‐dam	  gospel	   after	   their	   own	   water	   resources	   have	   been	   fully	   exploited	   and	   their	  population’s	   water	   and	   energy	   needs	   are	   secured.	   Thirteen	   years	   after	   the	  WCD,	  contrary	   to	   Patrick	  McCully’s	   hope	   that	   “the	   dam	   industry	   is	   entering	   a	   recession	  that	  they	  will	  never	  recover	  from”	  (309),	  it	  has	  actually	  seen	  a	  renaissance.	  	   Water	  security	  has	  become	  a	  vital	  issue	  in	  our	  global	  political	  economy,	  and	  international	  disputes	   stemming	   from	  competing	  national	   interests,	   such	  as	   in	   the	  Mekong	  River	  which	  spans	  five	  South-­‐east	  Asian	  countries;	  will	  become	  increasingly	  important.	  Costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  future	  dams	  will	  be	  disbursed	  not	  just	  to	  different	  populations	  within	  a	  country	  but	  to	  different	  countries;	  and	  the	  compensation	  and	  negotiation	  process	  must	  also	  be	  a	  multilateral	  one.	  In	  cases	  where	  there	  is	  a	  huge	  difference	  in	  economic	  and	  political	  might	  between	  countries	  (for	  example,	  between	  
	  34	  	  Nepal	  and	  India),	  it	  would	  be	  easy	  to	  imagine	  how	  cost	  and	  benefit	  distribution	  may	  be	  inequitable.	  	  	   We	  will	   investigate	  how	   this	  happens	   in	   the	  next	   section,	  which	   focuses	  on	  India’s	  dams	  and	  the	  Sardar	  Sarovar	  project	  in	  particular.	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  why	  Sardar	  Sarovar	  is	  a	  good	  case	  study	  to	  illustrate	  these	  challenges.	  First,	  with	  its	  dubious	   status	   as	   the	   most	   well-­‐known	   dam	   controversy	   in	   the	   world	   (more	  recently,	   the	   Three	   Gorges	   Dam	   in	   China	   may	   have	   taken	   that	   title),	   there	   is	   a	  sufficient	  amount	  of	  academic	  literature	  and	  public	  documents	  for	  it	  to	  be	  possible	  to	  analyze	  the	  situation	  ex	  situ.	  Second,	  it	  involves	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  adverse	  impacts	  of	   dams	   —	   displacement,	   exploitation	   of	   indigenous	   rights,	   environmental	  destruction,	   loss	  of	  culture	  and	  social	  cohesion,	  and	  widespread	  corruption.	  Third,	  the	   complex	   interactions	   of	   India’s	   political	   system,	   whereby	   states	   and	   federal	  government	   share	   power,	   make	   it	   a	   useful	   case	   to	   observe	   how	   the	   interplay	  between	   different	   state	   agencies,	   the	   judicial	   system	   and	   the	   wider	   international	  funding	   agencies	   affected	   every	   aspect	   of	   the	   dam	   development;	   from	   initial	  decision	  making	   to	   construction	   to	   subsequent	   apportioning	   of	   cost	   and	   benefits.	  Fourth,	  the	  Sardar	  Sarovar	  dam	  was	  the	  birthplace	  of	  the	  global	  anti-­‐dam	  movement	  based	   in	   the	   South	  with	   the	  Narmada	  Bachao	  Andolan	   (Save	   the	  Narmada	  River),	  and	  its	  ripple	  effects	  have	  been	  instrumental	  in	  changing	  policy	  as	  well	  as	  people’s	  attitudes	   towards	   dams	   not	   only	   in	   India	   but	   throughout	   the	   dam-­‐building	   and	  funding	  world.	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Chapter	  3:	  The	  Sardar	  Sarovar	  Project,	  1957-­2006	  
	  
Historical,	  Political	  and	  Economic	  Context	  of	  Indian	  Dams	  	   Agricultural	   irrigation	   in	   India	   has	   developed	   in	   traditional	   forms	   for	  thousands	  of	  years;	  spanning	  the	  gamut	  of	  	  small	  dams,	  wells,	  rainwater	  harvesting,	  and	   other	   terrain-­‐specific	   irrigation	   methods.	   The	   temporal	   and	   geographical	  scarcity	  of	  water	  in	  India	  has	  been	  an	  ever-­‐present	  concern	  throughout	  its	  history.	  	  	   In	   the	   1960s,	   the	   Green	   Revolution	   began	   in	   India;	   tripling	   rice	   yields	   and	  leading	   to	   massive	   growth	   in	   agricultural	   productivity.	   Between	   1951	   and	   2000,	  food	  grain	  production	  in	  India	  nearly	  quadrupled,	  with	  2/3	  of	  this	  increase	  coming	  from	   irrigated	   areas	   (Duflo	   606).	   	   New	   intensive	   cropping	   methods	   required	   far	  more	  water,	  	  leading	  to	  a	  greater	  need	  for	  dams	  to	  provide	  a	  stable	  irrigation	  supply	  for	  farmers	  and	  a	  cushion	  during	  times	  of	  	  drought.	  Dams	  in	  India	  are	  estimated	  to	  have	   contributed	   between	   10%	   and	   80%	   to	   the	   growth	   in	   India’s	   agricultural	  production	  since	  1950	  (WCD	  and	  ICOLD	  figures,	  respectively).	  	  	   Planners	   and	   international	   agencies	   responded	   to	   the	   increased	   need	  with	  dam-­‐building	   fervor.	   Between	   1950	   and	   1993,	   India	   was	   the	   largest	   single	  beneficiary	   of	  World	   Bank	   lending	   for	   irrigation.	   There	  were	   over	   4,050	   dams	   in	  India	   in	   2006,	   with	   another	   475	   under	   construction,	   of	   which	   over	   80%	   are	  irrigation	  dams	  (Central	  Water	  Commission	  2004).	  	  	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   building	   of	   dams	   for	   irrigation,	   hydropower	   dams	   are	   a	  solution	  used	  by	  the	  government	  to	  meet	  the	  increasing	  needs	  of	  the	  Indian	  industry,	  particularly	   in	  aluminum	  manufacturing.	  Hydropower	   in	   India	   is	   a	   cheaper	  option	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  than	   thermal	  production	  (from	  coal	  and	  gas).	   Indian	   industrialists,	  who	   in	  general	  are	  supporters	  of	  hydropower,	  are	  well-­‐connected	  and	  able	  to	  influence	  government	  decisions	  and	  policies	  in	  support	  of	  their	  interests	  (Dwivedi	  123).	  	   	  	   Decision-­‐making	  on	  water	  policy	  and	  dams	  in	  India	  is	  a	  complex	  issue.	  Water	  rights	  in	  India	  are	  constitutionally	  state	  matters,	  but	  inter-­‐state	  water	  disputes	  can	  be	  referred	  to	  the	  government	  for	  an	  investigation	  by	  a	  federally	  appointed	  tribunal,	  which	  will	  then	  appoint	  a	  final	  verdict.	  	  However	  in	  the	  Sardar	  Sarovar	  Project	  (SSP),	  various	  stakeholders	  who	  were	  not	  included	  in	  the	  original	  investigation	  repeatedly	  challenged	   the	   verdict	   of	   the	   Tribunal.	   This	   further	   illustrates	   the	   difficulties	   of	  apportioning	  benefits	  and	  costs	  in	  a	  complex	  and	  dynamic	  environment.	  	  	   ‘Center-­‐state	   relations’	   (the	   relationship	   between	   the	   federal	   and	   the	   state	  governments)	   were	   extremely	   influential	   in	   the	   planning	   and	   construction	   of	   the	  SSP.	  During	  certain	  periods	  of	  SSP	  dam	  contestation	  from	  1963	  to	  2006,	  particularly	  in	   the	   mid-­‐60s	   and	   70s,	   the	   party	   in	   power	   at	   the	   national	   level	   was	   weak	   and	  required	  state	  support.	  This	  enabled	  politicians	  of	  strong	  states	  like	  Gujarat	  to	  wield	  more	  power	  in	  negotiations	  with	  the	  government.	  This	  compromised	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  bring	  states	  together	  and	  act	  decisively	  on	  the	  SSP.	  	  	   The	  context	  of	  Indian	  political	  and	  economic	  culture	  is	  highly	  relevant	  to	  the	  problems	   that	  arose	  with	   the	  SSP.	   It	   is	  one	   that	   is	   rife	  with	  endemic	  corruption;	  a	  problem	   enabled	   by	   bureaucratic	   red	   tape,	   opaque	   policies,	   and	   the	  wide	   income	  and	  education	  gap	  between	  elites	  and	   the	  poor.	   In	  2012,	   India	   ranked	  94th	  of	  183	  nations	  on	   the	  Transparency	   International	  Corruption	  Perceptions	   Index.	  This	  has	  adversely	   affected	   the	   amount	   of	   net	   benefit	   that	   India	   gains	   from	   its	   dams.	   The	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  WCD	   found	   that	   dams	   built	   in	   South	   Asia	   were	   most	   likely	   to	   exceed	   projected	  construction	   costs	   due	  mainly	   to	   time	  delays.	   India	   also	  has	   “the	  worst	   record	  on	  resettlement	   for	   any	   democratically	   elected	   country”,	   displacing	   over	   ten	   million	  people	  from	  dams	  alone	  (Scudder	  2003,	  3).	  	  	   The	   communities	   affected	   by	   the	   SSP	  were	   particularly	   vulnerable.	   Tribals	  (adivasis),	  a	  group	  that	   is	  considered	  even	  lower	  than	  the	  lowest	  rank	  in	  the	  caste	  system,	   are	   only	   5%	   of	   India’s	   population	   but	   comprise	  more	   than	   50%	   of	   those	  displaced	   by	   dams	   (Parasumaran	   1999,	   cited	   in	   Scudder	   2003).	   As	   they	   sustain	  themselves	   on	   the	   produce	   of	   the	   forest	   and	   are	  mostly	   self-­‐sufficient,	   with	   little	  need	   for	   the	   cash	   economy,	   they	   are	   most	   likely	   to	   lose	   their	   livelihoods	   in	   the	  displacement	  process.	  They	  are	  also	  the	  least	  politically	  enfranchised	  group,	  which	  has	   made	   them	   most	   vulnerable	   to	   exploitation	   and	   unfair	   treatment	   (Baviskar	  1999).	  	   Social	   action	   groups	   (non-­‐governmental	   organizations)	   advocating	   for	  tribal’s	   rights	   and	   environmental	   issues	   became	   significant	   players	   in	   the	   SSP	  dispute.	  They	  successfully	  brought	  widespread	  media	  attention	  to	  their	  causes,	  and	  were	  able	  to	  use	  public	  opinion	  to	  apply	  pressure	  on	  state	  and	  national	  government	  to	  provide	  better	  compensation	  for	  the	  displaced	  communities.	  	  	  	  
The	  Sardar	  Sarovar	  Project	  	   The	   Sardar	   Sarovar	   Project	   is	   situated	   on	   the	   Narmada	   River,	   the	   largest	  river	  in	  western	  India	  and	  the	  fifth	  largest	  in	  the	  subcontinent.	  It	  flows	  east	  to	  west,	  through	  a	  relatively	  narrow	  valley	   for	  1300	  kilometers	   from	  the	  Western	  Ghats	   to	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  the	  Gulf	  of	  Cambay.	   It	   takes	  up	  a	   total	  of	  800sq	  km,	  and	   is	  distributed	   throughout	  Madhya	   Pradesh	   (87%),	   Gujarat	   (11%)	   and	   Maharashtra	   (2%).	   Annual	   flow	  averages	  45,000	  million	  cubic	  meters	  (36.48	  million	  acre	  feet	  -­‐	  MAF),	  with	  over	  90%	  of	   runoff	   during	   the	   monsoon	   season	   (Dwivedi	   59).	   Agriculture	   is	   the	   main	  economic	  activity	  in	  the	  Narmada	  River	  basin,	  with	  livestock	  management,	  foraging,	  and	   fishing	   in	   the	   tribal	   areas.	   For	   centuries,	   the	   Narmada	   River	   has	   held	   special	  spiritual	   significance	   to	   Hindus	   and	   is	   regarded	   as	   India’s	   most	   holy	   river,	   with	  many	  travelers	  walking	  the	  length	  of	  the	  river	  on	  pilgrimage	  (Baviskar	  1999).	  	  	   The	  Narmada	  Basin	  development	  program,	   as	   sketched	  out	   in	   the	  Tribunal	  Report,	   is	   a	   cascade	  of	  dams	  on	   the	  main	   stream	  and	  on	  major	   tributaries.	   Sardar	  Sarovar	  Project	  was	  to	  be	  the	  only	  one	  on	  the	  main	  stem	  of	  the	  Narmada	  in	  Gujarat,	  the	   rest	   of	   the	   projects	   being	   in	   Madhya	   Pradesh	   (Scudder	   2003).	   The	   Sardar	  Sarovar	  Project	  would	  divert	  9.5	  MAF	  of	  water	  annually	  out	  of	  the	  total	  agreed-­‐upon	  flow	  of	  28	  MAF.	  	  	   Under	  the	  Tribunal’s	  agreement,	  the	  water	  benefits	  of	  the	  dam	  would	  mostly	  accrue	  to	  drought-­‐prone	  Gujarat,	  while	  the	  hydroelectricity	  benefits	  would	  go	  to	  the	  less-­‐developed	  states	  of	  Maharashtra	  and	  Madhya	  Pradesh.	  The	  main	  canal	  would	  irrigate	  an	  area	  of	  1.8	  m.ha,	   roughly	  20%	  of	   the	   total	   cultivable	  area	  of	  Gujarat.	  A	  canal	  network	  of	  around	  50,000	  km	  would	  serve	  this	  command	  area.	  The	  main	  canal	  with	  31	  branch	  canals	  will	  cover	  12	  districts	  and	  3,344	  villages	  in	  Gujarat.	  The	  1,450	  megawatt	   installed	  capacity	   from	  the	  SSP	  would	  be	   fed	   into	   the	  Western	  Regional	  Electric	  Grid,	  and	  its	  benefits	  would	  go	  mostly	  to	  Madhya	  Pradesh	  and	  Maharashtra.	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  The	  projected	  costs	  for	  this	  project	  range	  from	  $15	  billion	  over	  45	  years,	  to	  Rs	  62.6	  billion	  (see	  Table	  1	  in	  Appendix).	  	  	   As	  with	  all	   large	  infrastructure	  projects,	  despite	  a	  net	  benefit	  to	  society,	  the	  SSP	   will	   create	   winners	   and	   losers.	   A	   potential	   beneficiary	   of	   the	   project	   is	   the	  industrial	   sector,	   which	   consumes	   70%	   of	   electricity	   in	   India.	   Industrial	   estates	  expect	   power	   and	   water	   benefits	   from	   the	   dam,	   and	   have	   the	   most	   political	   and	  economic	  power	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  benefits	  are	  diverted	  to	  them	  first	  (Dwivedi	  123).	  Farmers	   at	   the	   head	   end	   of	   the	   command	   area,	   comprised	  mostly	   of	   rich	   farmers	  doing	  capital-­‐intensive	  agriculture,	  will	  be	  the	  first	  to	  benefit.	  Farmers	  at	  the	  tail	  end	  of	  the	  command	  area,	  in	  places	  that	  are	  drought-­‐prone,	  will	  only	  receive	  benefits	  at	  the	  pace	  of	  irrigation	  infrastructure	  (Dwivedi	  124).	  In	  addition,	  a	  higher	  demand	  for	  wage	   labor	   will	   benefit	   local	   villagers	   as	   irrigated	   farming	   develops,	   creating	   a	  multiplier	  effect.	  Professionals	  such	  as	  NGO	  workers	  and	  project	  administrators	  and	  bureaucrats	   will	   also	   benefit,	   as	   skilled	   labor	   constitutes	   27%	   of	   project	   costs	  (Dwivedi	  126).	  	  	   Less	  publicized	  but	  certainly	  present	  are	  the	  gains	  to	  rent	  seekers,	  those	  who	  benefit	  materially	  from	  corruption	  present	  in	  each	  aspect	  of	  planning	  and	  execution	  of	   the	   project	   -­‐	   contractors,	   bureaucrats,	   consultants,	   politicians	   (Dwivedi	   126).	  Finally,	   affected	  villagers	   and	   fishermen	  benefit	   from	  an	   improved	  drinking	  water	  supply.	   This	   benefit	   however,	   cannot	   be	   expected	   until	   20	   years	   after	   dam	  completion.	   Fisheries	   can	   expect	   reservoir	   development,	   however	   the	   gains	   are	  prone	   to	   capture	   by	   private	   contractors	   who	   buy	   up	   the	   auctioning	   rights.	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  Downstream	  farmers	  may	  gain	  some	  benefit	  from	  the	  periodic	  drawdown	  of	  water	  from	  the	  dam	  (Dwivedi	  127).	  	  	   The	   biggest	   losers	   are	   farmers	   in	   the	   reservoir	   zone,	   although	   the	   relative	  impacts	  will	  differ	  based	  on	  region	  and	  ethnic	  group.	  Families	  with	  large	  holdings	  in	  fertile	  areas	  lose	  the	  most,	  as	  there	  is	  a	  cap	  on	  compensation.	  Adivasis,	  who	  are	  least	  integrated	  into	  modern	  society,	  suffer	  due	  to	  social	  marginalization	  when	  resettled,	  and	  are	  not	  compensated	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  common	  resources,	  which	  allowed	  them	  to	  live	  off	  the	  land.	  Landless	  laborers	  and	  marginal	  farmers,	  who	  comprise	  more	  than	  50%	   of	   project-­‐affected	   people	   in	   the	   reservoir	   zone,	   also	   face	   high	   risks	   of	  impoverishment	  (Dwivedi	  128).	  Women	  also	  often	  suffer	  disproportionately	  in	  the	  resettlement	   process	   as	   they	   lose	   their	   common	   resources	   and	   social	   networks,	  depriving	   them	   of	   their	   economic	   contribution	   to	   the	   household	   and	   their	  community	   support	   (Mehta	   115,	   cited	   in	   Dwivedi	   129).	   Canal-­‐affected	   people,	  fishermen,	   and	   forest	   encroachers	   also	   face	   economic	   losses	   with	   no	   certainty	   of	  compensation	   or	   benefits,	   as	   they	   are	   not	   included	   in	   the	   compensation	   scheme	  (Dwivedi	  130).	  	   While	   the	  displacement	  costs	  are	   likely	   to	  be	  extensive,	   there	  have	  been	  no	  definite	  figures	  on	  the	  number	  of	  people	  affected.	  Figures	  range	  from	  90,000	  people	  (with	   an	   average	   of	   6	   in	   a	   family)	   to	   over	   500,000	   people,	   when	   canal	   owners,	  landless	  laborers,	  and	  forest	  encroachers	  are	  included	  (see	  Table	  2	  in	  Appendix).	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   are	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   of	   the	   alternative	   water	   management	   schemes	   that	   would	  provide	  benefits	  to	  the	  affected	  people	  with	  fewer	  negative	  impacts?	  One	  solution	  is	  to	   build	   smaller,	   community-­‐managed	   village	   dams	   and	   water	   structures.	   An	  unpublished	  study	  from	  the	  Narmada	  Valley	  Task	  Force,	  formed	  by	  the	  government	  of	   India	   in	   1988	   and	   consisting	   of	   independent	   experts,	   government	   officials,	   and	  NBA	   representatives,	   investigated	   the	   possibilities	   for	   non-­‐conventional	   power	  sources	   (Dharmadhikary	   2000).	   The	  WCD	   also	   emphasizes	   the	   need	   for	   demand-­‐side	   management	   and	   improvements	   in	   the	   efficiency	   of	   water	   and	   electricity	  distribution,	  as	  open	  reservoirs	  lose	  a	  lot	  of	  water	  simply	  through	  evaporation	  (221).	  	   One	  alternative	  that	  was	  studied	  by	  Scudder	  is	  the	  Bunga	  check	  dams,	  set	  up	  in	  a	  small	  village	  of	  178	  families.	  Researchers	  from	  the	  University	  of	  California	  found	  the	   dams	   created	   significant	   benefits	   and	   multipliers	   that	   increased	   income	   to	  villagers	   and	   surrounding	   areas,	   including	   reduction	   of	   rainy	   season	   flooding,	   a	  reduction	   in	   erosion	   due	   to	   catchment	   protection,	   and	   a	   raised	   water	   table	   that	  allowed	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  tube	  well.	  Marginal	  and	  small	  farmers	  increased	  their	  incomes	   by	   a	   greater	   percentage	   than	   medium	   and	   large	   farming	   households	  (Scudder	  2003).	  	  	  	   The	  Government	  of	  India’s	  and	  the	  pro-­‐dam	  establishment’s	  response	  to	  this	  is	  that	  these	  alternatives	  are	  unrealistic	  (Biswas	  5).	  Even	  if	  they	  are	  able	  to	  provide	  a	  decent	  amount	  of	  water	   for	  a	   community’s	   irrigation	  and	  electricity,	   small	  dams	  cannot	  meet	  demand	  for	  water	  security,	  because	  they	  do	  not	  store	  enough	  water	  for	  sustenance	   during	   drought	   periods.	   In	   addition,	   some	   communities	   (such	   as	   in	  “thirsty”	  Rajasthan)	  do	  not	  have	  enough	  water	  to	  sustain	  their	  needs	  locally.	  	  
	  42	  	  	   Small	  dams	  or	  other	  small-­‐scale	  solutions	  provide	  less	  incentive	  for	  political	  adoption.	  They	  lack	  glamour,	  and	  do	  not	  provide	  politicians	  and	  local	  governments	  the	   level	   of	   publicity	   that	   they	   need	   for	   re-­‐election.	   The	   decentralized	   nature	   of	  small	   dams	   and	   community	   management	   also	   means	   that	   there	   are	   fewer	  opportunities	   for	   personal	   gain	   by	   taking	   advantage	   of	   massive	   coordination	  problems.	  For	  similar	  reasons,	  the	  rejection	  of	  small-­‐	  scale	  and	  alternative	  solutions	  to	   large	   dams	   in	   India	   is	   echoed	   on	   the	   international	   stage.
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Cost	  Benefit	  Analyses	  in	  the	  SSP	  	   It	   is	   striking	   to	  note	  how	  all	   the	  decisions	  on	  whether	   Sardar	   Sarovar	  dam	  should	  be	  built,	  its	  technical	  details	  (height	  of	  the	  dam),	  the	  apportioning	  of	  benefits	  and	   extent	   of	   rehabilitation	   costs	   were	   not	   dependent	   on	   one	   pre-­‐project	   cost-­‐benefit	  analysis,	  but	  were	  hammered	  out	  through	  a	  series	  of	  multi-­‐year	  negotiations	  and	  confrontations	  between	  various	  quarters.	  All	  the	  parties	  involved	  invoked	  some	  form	   of	   cost	   benefit	   analyses	   as	   a	   means	   of	   justifying	   the	   course	   of	   action	   they	  promoted.	  By	  examining	  these	  analyses,	  we	  see	  how	  changing	  the	  assumptions	  on	  which	  cost-­‐benefit	  analyses	  are	  determined,	  can	  drastically	  alter	  the	  rational	  path	  of	  action,	   and	   how	   economic	   arguments	   can	   be	   used	   to	   disguise	   or	   justify	   political	  decision.	  	  	   The	   conflict	   in	   the	   Sardar	   Sarovar	   Project	   began	   as	   an	   inter-­‐state	   water	  dispute.	   The	   states	   of	  Madhya	   Pradesh	   and	  Maharashtra,	   located	   upstream	   of	   the	  river,	   wanted	   to	   build	   their	   own	   dam	   to	   generate	   hydroelectricity	   and	   were	  resentful	  of	  sharing	  what	  they	  saw	  as	  their	  rightful	  resources,	  even	  though	  they	  had	  less	   need	   for	   the	   water	   at	   the	   time	   than	   the	   more-­‐developed	   state	   of	   Gujarat.	  Madhya	  Pradesh	  and	  Maharashtra	  repeatedly	  tried	  to	  block	  Gujarat’s	  claims	  in	  the	  courts,	  and	  protested	  to	  Rajasthan,	  a	  non-­‐riparian	  state,	  being	  included	  as	  a	  claimant	  to	  the	  dam	  as	  Rajasthan	  would	  side	  with	  Gujarat.	  Gujarat	  wanted	  the	  dam	  to	  be	  built	  to	   channel	   water	   to	   its	   arid	   western	   regions.	   Gujarat	   had	   a	   more	   effective	   and	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  politically	   connected	   government	   that	   was	   better	   able	   to	   argue	   their	   needs,	   and	  therefore	  was	  often	  able	  to	  win	  in	  the	  water	  disputes.	  	  	   As	   the	   allocation	   decisions	   often	   depended	   on	   relative	   states’	   bargaining	  power	   rather	   than	  on	   an	   equity	  principle	   of	   helping	   the	   least	  developed,	   the	   less-­‐developed	   states	   received	   proportionately	   less	   benefits.	   The	   Khosla	   Committee5,	  judging	  based	  on	  national	  interest	  and	  the	  maximal	  benefit	  from	  allocation,	  favored	  Gujarat	   in	   their	   decision.	   There	  was	   an	   evident	   tension	   between	   upholding	   states	  sovereignty	   and	   serving	   national	   interest.	   This	   was	   especially	   evident	   in	   the	  decision	   to	   include	   Rajasthan,	   a	   non-­‐riparian	   state,	   as	   a	   disputant,	   as	   under	   an	  ownership	  paradigm	   they	   should	  not	   be	   included.	  However,	   due	   to	   their	   need	   for	  water,	   even	   the	   high	   cost	   required	   to	   build	   canals	   reaching	   into	   Rajasthan	   was	  justified	  in	  the	  national	  interest.	  	  	   In	  addition,	  the	  original	  cost-­‐benefit	  calculations	  from	  the	  Khosla	  Committee	  continued	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  Narmada	  Water	  Disputes	  Tribunal	  (NWDT)	  decision	  to	  allocate	  benefits	   and	   costs	   for	   each	   state.	  Reappraisals	   in	   the	  1990s	   conducted	  by	  both	  the	  government	  of	  India	  as	  well	  as	  the	  World	  Bank	  	  showed	  a	  positive	  internal	  rate	   of	   return	   (Table	   3	   in	   Appendix).	   Anti-­‐dam	   activists	   argue	   that	   the	   true	  resettlement	   and	   environmental	   mitigation	   costs	   were	   flawed,	   	   due	   to	   a	   lack	   of	  political	   will	   to	   calculate	   the	   true	   costs.	   In	   the	   later	   years,	   as	   the	   NBA	   (Narmada	  Bachao	   Andolan),	   the	   leading	   anti-­‐dam	  NGO	   in	   the	   SSP,	   increased	   its	   influence,	   it	  continually	   challenged	   the	   accuracy	   and	   veracity	   of	   the	   NWDT’s	   claims.	   The	  government	  continued	  to	  assert	  that	  the	  SSP	  would	  result	  in	  a	  positive	  internal	  rate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  An	  expert	  committee	  headed	  by	  A.	  N.	  Khosla	  set	  up	  to	  apportion	  benefits	  fairly	  among	  different	  states.	  Please	  refer	  to	  SSP	  Timeline	  in	  Appendix	  for	  further	  details.	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  of	   return,	   but	   it	   did	   concede	   to	   increasing	   rehabilitation	   and	   resettlement	  compensation	   for	   resettlers.	   The	   advocacy	   of	   the	   NBA	   also	   rekindled	   worldwide	  interest	  on	  the	  relative	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  dams,	  which	  was	  part	  of	  the	  impetus	  for	  studies	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Commission	  on	  Dams.	  	   The	  Tribunal’s	  decision,	  as	  covered	  by	  India’s	  Water	  Disputes	  Act	  of	  1957,	  is	  meant	   to	   be	   final;	   but	   the	   steps	   of	   its	   implementation	   were	   not	   specified	   in	   the	  Award.	   To	   do	   facilitate	   this	   process,	   the	   government	   set	   up	   the	  Narmada	   Control	  Authority	  (NCA).	  However	  as	  the	  legal	  process	  was	  continually	  challenged	  in	  court	  by	  public	  interest	  litigation	  over	  the	  next	  few	  decades,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  dam	   should	   even	   be	   built	   came	   to	   the	   forefront.	   There	   also	   existed	   significant	  internal	  and	  external	  pressure	  to	  reassess	  the	  project	  –	  from	  within	  the	  government	  (through	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Environment	   and	   Forests	   with	   the	   passing	   of	   India’s	  Environmental	   Protection	   Act),	   from	   local	   and	   international	   NGOs,	   and	   from	  international	   funders	   (The	  World	  Bank	   Independent	  Review	   reviewed	   the	   project	  negatively).	  	  	   The	   significant	   negotiation	   and	   concessions	   from	   the	   state	   governments	   in	  the	   terms	   of	   the	   Award	   showed	   that	   decisions	   of	   NWDT	   were	   not	   completely	  binding,	   which	   allowed	   more	   questioning	   of	   the	   rationale	   of	   the	   entire	   project.	  India’s	  prior	  record	  on	  resettlement	  has	  been	  heavily	  criticized,	  but	   it	  does	  have	  a	  strong	   democratic	   tradition,	   powerful	  media,	   and	   viable	   political	   opposition.	   This	  environment	  allowed	  for	  advocacy	  groups	  to	  trigger	  public	  debate	  and	  gain	  media	  attention.	  
	  46	  	  	   The	  strength	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  advocating	  against	  the	  SSP	  was	  	  not	  entirely	  a	  good	  thing	  for	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  dam	  building	  process.	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  strong	  state	  able	  to	  execute	  effectively	  and	  quickly,	  combined	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  to	  push	  through	   an	   unpopular	   decision,	   led	   to	   many	   delays,	   which	   increased	   costs	   and	  reduced	  the	  IRR	  of	  the	  project.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  NGOs	  who	  advocated	  on	  behalf	   of	   the	   resettled	   groups,	   the	   uncertainty,	   delays,	   and	   lack	   of	   information	  placed	   huge	   psychological	   stress	   on	   would-­‐be	   resettlers,	   whose	   living	   standards	  often	  worsen	  as	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  plan	  for	  the	  future	  nor	  given	  the	  compensation	  they	  were	  promised	  (Scudder	  33).	  	   As	  a	  last	  resort,	  the	  NBA	  put	  their	  faith	  in	  the	  judicial	  system	  to	  stop	  the	  dam	  building	   process,	   filing	   a	   writ	   petition	   against	   the	   government	   of	   India.	   Initial	  environmental	  clearance	  required	  states	  concerned	   to	   take	  certain	  steps	   including	  resettlement	   and	   rehabilitation,	   pari	   passu	   (in	   step	   with)	   the	   construction	   of	   the	  dam.	  The	  NBA	  alleged	  that	  this	  was	  not	  done,	  and	  on	  that	  basis	  filed	  their	  suit.	  They	  sought	  for	  all	  construction	  on	  the	  dam	  to	  be	  stopped,	  and	  the	  case	  eventually	  went	  to	   the	   Supreme	   Court.	   They	  were	   hopeful	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   support,	   as	   the	  courts	  had	  previously	  issued	  a	  stay	  on	  construction	  in	  1995.	  Much	  to	  their	  surprise,	  the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   final	   decision	   in	   2000	   was	   that	   the	   conditions	   had	   been	  followed,	  and	  that	  SSP’s	  construction	  could	  be	  resumed	  immediately.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  justified	  their	  decision	  as	  one	  of	  maintaining	  the	  separation	  between	  judiciary	  and	  the	  executive/legislative	  powers,	  and	  disclaimed	  responsibility	  for	  deciding	  on	  whether	   the	   SSP	   represented	   a	   net	   benefit	   for	   the	   country.	  Many	   saw	   in	   the	   SSP	  decision	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   a	   move	   away	   from	   entertaining	   public	   interest	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  litigations	  (Wood	  191).	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  which	  views	  the	  Sardar	  Sarovar	  debate	  through	   a	   political	   lens,	   I	   will	   examine	   the	   arguments	   put	   forth	   by	   the	   Supreme	  Court,	  particularly	  in	  regards	  to	  cost	  benefit	  analysis.	  
	  
Political	  Uses	  of	  Cost	  Benefit	  Analysis	  in	  the	  SSP	  	   The	   SSP	   dispute	   started	   as	   one	   between	   state	   riparian	   rights	   and	   national	  interest.	   In	   the	   1970s,	   around	   the	   time	   of	   environmental	   movement’s	   rise	   in	   the	  West,	  the	  first	  activist	  groups	  started	  bringing	  attention	  to	  the	  plight	  of	  adivasis	  	  and	  other	   vulnerable	   groups.	   The	  debate	   became	  one	   of	   redistributive	   justice	   and	   fair	  treatment,	   and	   there	   was	   room	   from	   negotiation	   between	   the	   state	   governments	  and	  the	  activist	  groups.	  However,	  as	  the	  crisis	  deepened,	  and	  evidence	  of	  the	  empty	  (or	  erratically	  fulfilled)	  promises	  of	  resettlement	  increased	  (particularly	  in	  Madhya	  Pradesh),	   some	   NGOs	   changed	   their	   stance	   towards	   the	   dam.	   The	   NBA,	   which	  worked	   primarily	   in	   the	   poorer	   states	   of	   Madhya	   Pradesh	   and	   Maharashtra	   that	  bore	   most	   of	   the	   resettlement	   and	   environmental	   destruction	   burden;	   adopted	   a	  radical	   stance	   against	   all	   dam	   projects.	   This	   stemmed	   from	   their	   disillusionment	  that	  the	  government	  and	  project	  authorities	  were	  serious	  about	  conducting	  proper	  rehabilitation,	   as	   evidenced	  by	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   national	   resettlement	  policy	   that	  was	  due	   in	   1980,	   and	   the	   appalling	   lack	   of	   studies	   on	   the	   extent	   of	   rehabilitation	   and	  number	  of	  people	  who	  needed	  to	  be	  resettled.	  Tellingly,	  this	  information	  is	  still	  not	  available	  from	  the	  government	  today.	  	  	   In	   contrast,	   ARCH-­‐Vahini	   and	   other	   NGOs	   working	   in	   Gujarat	   were	   more	  amenable	  to	  negotiations	  with	  project	  authorities	  for	  better	  resettlement	  conditions.	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  Their	   early	   victories	   in	   gaining	   concessions	   for	   Gujarat	   oustees	  may	   have	   shaped	  their	  political	  views,	  just	  as	  the	  reluctance	  of	  authorities	  to	  act	  on	  the	  heavier	  human	  and	   environmental	   costs	   in	   Madhya	   Pradesh	   hugely	   influenced	   Medha	   Patkar	   to	  radicalize	  NBA.	  As	  the	  NBA	  gained	  momentum	  and	  gained	  strength	  and	  legitimacy	  from	   the	   international	   anti-­‐dam	   movement,	   the	   critique	   against	   dam	   projects	  evolved	  into	  a	  larger	  socialist	  critique	  of	  capitalism	  and	  the	  development	  paradigm.	  	  	   The	   radical	   stance	   adopted	   by	   the	   NBA	   and	   other	   groups	   had	   significant	  political	  implications.	  Although	  NBA	  lost	  the	  SSP	  battle,	  they	  had	  moved	  the	  needle	  on	   the	   public’s	   understanding	   of	   the	   issues	   concerning	   dams	   and	   large	  infrastructure	  projects.	  Their	  advocacy	  brought	  international	  attention	  to	  the	  Indian	  government’s	   lack	  of	  care	   in	  resettlement	  and	  environmental	  mitigation,	  and	  their	  work	   has	   improved	   the	   rehabilitation	   terms	   at	   least	   on	   paper.	  What	  was	   the	   cost	  however,	  at	  which	  this	  was	  achieved?	  It	  may	  be	  argued	  that	  through	  their	  hardline	  position,	  the	  NBA	  alienated	  more	  people	  than	  they	  enlisted,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  created	  general	  skepticism	  of	  anti-­‐development	  critiques	  in	  India.	  There	  are	  some	  indicators	  that	   public	   opinion	   turned	   against	   the	   NBA	   in	   1999-­‐2000,	   but	   with	   the	   quick	  reversals	   of	   politics,	   there	  may	   be	   a	   resurgence	   of	   anti-­‐capitalist	   politics	   at	   some	  point	  in	  the	  future	  (Wood	  178).	  What	  is	  less	  speculative	  are	  the	  very	  real	  effects	  of	  defeat	   for	   oustees.	   The	   villagers	   who	   played	   a	   leading	   role	   in	   the	   NBA	   now	   find	  themselves	  on	  the	  losing	  end,	  having	  lost	  everything	  they	  owned	  and	  forced	  to	  ask	  for	   the	   little	   compensation	   they	   are	   entitled	   to	   from	   their	   previous	   opponents	  (Dwivedi,	  xxiv).	  
	  49	  	  	   Besides	   advancing	   public	   understanding	   of	   the	   costs	   associated	   with	   dam	  building,	   the	   other	   significant	   contribution	   of	   the	   NBA	   and	   other	   groups	   that	  opposed	  the	  dam,	  including	  the	  World	  Bank	  Independent	  Review,	  was	  to	  challenge	  the	   legitimacy	  of	  cost-­‐benefit	  analyses	  done	  ex-­‐post	   to	   justify	   the	  dam.	  The	  official	  figures	  are	  reliant	  on	  so	  many	  assumptions	  of	  uncertain	  variables	  (rainfall,	  siltation	  rates,	   costs	   of	   submergence	   and	   rehabilitation)	   that	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   disclaim	   the	  possibility	   of	   political	   manipulation.	   The	   NBA	   movement	   was	   unconvinced	   by	  multiple	   reappraisals	   of	   the	   dam	   by	   the	   government	   and	   the	  World	   Bank,	   which	  showed	   a	   positive	   return	   as	   they	   continued	   to	   doubt	   the	   methodology	   of	   their	  analyses.	  	   As	   Theodore	   Potter	   writes,	   “the	   power	   of	   techniques	   like	   cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	   lies	   not	   in	   their	   actual	   results	   but	   in	   the	   promises	   that	   these	   results	   are	  available	  through	  their	  application.	  The	  essence	  of	  the	  promise	  of	  these	  results	  lies	  in	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   ritual”	   (1991,	   cited	   in	  Dwivedi	   119).	   Cost-­‐benefit	   analysis	  operates	   upon	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   preferences	   of	   decision-­‐makers	   reflect	  broader	   societal	   values.	   State	   objectives	   become	   proxies	   for	   societal	   welfare.	   In	  assessing	  the	  merits	  of	  various	  projects,	  the	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  will	  thus	  take	  into	  account	  the	  state’s	  objectives,	  what	  it	  wants	  to	  do	  with	  resources	  and	  how	  it	  wants	  to	   distribute	   them.	   The	   analysis	   ought	   to	   echo	   state	   preferences	   in	   resource	  development	   (Dwivedi	   122).	   This	   preference	   of	   state	   interests	   over	   other	  stakeholders’	   interests	   leads	   to	   restrictions	   on	   information	   and	   access,	   especially	  from	  3rd	  party	  observers	  or	  anti-­‐dam	  advocates.	  Scudder	  writes	  of	  being	  prohibited	  from	  meeting	  NGO	  leaders	  while	  on	  a	  World	  Bank	  mission	  to	  assess	  rehabilitation	  
	  50	  	  policies,	   an	  act	   that	   restricted	  his	   ability	   to	  observe	   conditions	   firsthand	   (Scudder	  2003).	  	  Another	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  national	  rehabilitation	  policy,	  a	  key	  human	  cost	  and	  a	  significant	  right	  of	  the	  displaced	  communities.	  This	  is	   in	  spite	  of	  overwhelming	   evidence	   and	   strong	   recommendations	   from	   multiple	   observers’	  reports.	  	  	   A	   legitimate	   cost	   benefit	   analysis	   cannot	   be	   done	   ex-­‐post	   as	   there	   is	   no	  incentive	   to	   find	   out	   the	   true	   costs	   and	   benefits	   and	   compare	   them	   to	   other	  alternatives	   when	   the	   decision	   to	   proceed	   has	   already	   been	   made.	   The	  appropriateness	   of	   cost	   benefit	   analyses’	   conducted	   at	   one	   point	   in	   time	   is	   also	  inherently	   limited.	   Estimations	   of	   costs	   increase	   as	   more	   information	   becomes	  available,	   as	   in	   the	   rising	   estimations	   of	   resettlement	   costs;	   and	   dynamic	   factors	  such	   as	   raw	  material	   prices	   fluctuate	   -­‐	   thus	   the	   assumptions	   of	   the	   original	   cost	  benefit	  analysis	  are	  no	   longer	  valid.	  As	  Dwivedi	  points	  out,	   the	  cost	  of	   the	  SSP	  has	  increased	  rapidly,	  from	  an	  initial	  estimate	  of	  Rs.	  42,000	  million	  in	  1982-­‐83,	  to	  about	  Rs.	   146,000	  million	   in	   1991-­‐92,	   a	   130%	   increase	   over	   the	   costs	   approved	   by	   the	  Planning	  Commission	   in	  1989	   (225).	  The	   actual	   considerations	  of	  what	   should	  be	  included	   in	   cost	   estimations	   have	   also	   changed	   considerably	   as	   public	  understanding	   of	   the	   need	   for	   more	   equitable	   resettlement	   compensation,	   and	  environmental	   mitigation	   increases.	   Even	   the	   most	   comprehensive	   cost	   benefit	  analysis	  conducted	  in	  the	  1950s	  would	  not	  be	  valid	  half	  a	  century	  later.	  	  	  	   The	   SSP	   illustrates	   how	   ineffective	   government	   and	   protracted	   dispute	  directly	  increases	  economic	  cost.	  If	  the	  project	  authorities	  had	  been	  willing	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  to	  implement	  the	  minimum	  requirements	  of	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  guidelines	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  on	   involuntary	   resettlement	   and	   on	   tribal	   people,	   and	   follow	   the	   requirements	   of	  their	   own	   Narmada	   Water	   Disputes	   Tribunal	   which	   stipulated	   the	   way	   in	   which	  Narmada	  basin	  development	  was	   to	  proceed,	   it	   is	  quite	  possible	   that	   a	  138	  meter	  high	   dam	  would	   have	   been	   completed	   during	   the	   1990s.	   In	   that	   event	   estimated	  expenses	  exceeding	  one	  billion	  dollars	  due	  to	  opposition-­‐caused	  delays	  could	  have	  been	  avoided	  (Blok	  and	  Haas	  2003,	  cited	  in	  Scudder	  2003).	  	   Cost	   benefit	   analysis	   is	   not	   value	   free.	   The	   cost	   benefit	   analyses	   done	   by	  project	   authorities	   privilege	   a	   different	   kind	   of	   risk	   from	   the	   alternative	   ones	  proposed	   by	   the	   Narmada	   movement	   privilege	   different	   types	   of	   risk.	   Project	  authorities	  valued	  optimal	  risk,	  which	  leads	  to	  a	  higher	  willingness	  to	  bear	  costs	  in	  order	   to	   reach	   a	   theoretical	   “optimum”.	   In	   contrast,	   activist	   groups	   prioritized	  oustees’	   welfare	   and	   minimizing	   environmental	   destruction;	   and	   focused	   on	  minimizing	   and	  were	  willing	   	   to	   give	   up	  uncertain	   returns	   to	   avoid	   certain	   losses	  (Dwivedi	  194).	  As	  a	  result,	   the	  benefits	  are	  overstated	  and	  cost	  understated	  in	  the	  former,	  while	  the	  opposite	  occurs	  in	  the	  latter.	  	   As	  Iyer6	  notes,	  even	  the	  language	  used	  in	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  can	  obfuscate	  the	  true	  issues	  involved.	  For	  instance,	  terms	  such	  as	  stakeholders	  are	  misleading	  as	  it	  gives	  every	  party	  an	  equal,	  neutral	  stake	   in	   the	  discussion,	  even	   those	  who	  may	  not	   have	   legitimate	   claims	  on	   the	  benefits.	   The	   losses	   of	   a	   company	  or	   the	  World	  Bank	  from	  a	  stake	  in	  financing	  the	  dam	  cannot	  be	  compared	  to	  the	  loss	  of	  a	  landless	  farmer	  in	  the	  command	  area,	  although	  the	  latter’s	  financial	  loss	  may	  be	  monetarily	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  A	  member	  of	  the	  Five	  Member	  Group	  (appointed	  by	  the	  central	  Ministry	  of	  Water	  Resources	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Narmada	  movements	  demands	  for	  independent	  evaluations	  of	  the	  SSP)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  a	  member	  of	  the	  team	  that	  wrote	  the	  India	  country	  study	  for	  the	  WCD	  Report.	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  much	  less	  than	  the	  former.	  The	  term	  stakeholder	  also	  masks	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  unwilling	   victims	   to	   development.	   In	   fact,	   due	   to	   the	   redistributive	   nature	   of	   the	  dam,	  some	  people	  are	  stake-­‐losers	  and	  others	  are	  stake-­‐winners	  (Iyer	  2001).	  	   Stating	  an	  argument	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  cost	  benefit	  analysis	  is	  a	  persuasive	  tool	   that	  was	  employed	  by	  both	  sides.	  The	  NBA	   intentionally	  used	  the	   language	  of	  science	  and	  invoked	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  techniques	  to	  win	  support,	  despite	  beliefs	  within	   the	  movement	   itself	   that	   these	  were	   flawed	   techniques.	   Some	  of	   the	   issues	  challenged	  by	   the	  Narmada	  movement	   are	  outlined	   in	   the	  Appendix	   (Table	  5).	  By	  employing	  scientific	  terminology	  and	  appropriating	  knowledge	  used	  by	  the	  project	  authorities	   to	  object	   to	   the	  dam,	   the	  Narmada	  movement	  sought	   legitimacy	   for	   its	  claims,	   cast	   doubt	   on	   official	   figures,	   and	   placed	   pressure	   on	   the	   government	   to	  improve	  their	  terms	  for	  rehabilitation	  by	  awaking	  public	  scrutiny.	  	  	   The	  subjectivity	  of	  cost-­‐benefit	  analyses	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  political	  influence	  upon	  these	  figures	  were	  also	  thrown	  into	  relief	  by	  the	  arguments	  from	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	   ruling.	   The	   Supreme	   Court’s	   justifications	   for	   its	   decision	   were	   skewed	  towards	  large	  dams,	  citing	  the	  benefits	  that	  dams	  bring	  without	  consideration	  of	  the	  large	   body	   of	   literature	   that	   disputes	   these	   benefits.	   The	   Supreme	   Court	   also	  disagreed	   that	   oustees’	   fundamental	   rights	   were	   violated	   through	   displacement,	  justifying	   this	  with	   the	   argument	   that	   living	   conditions	  would	   be	  much	   better	   for	  them	  than	  what	  they	  had	  in	  their	  ‘tribal	  hamlets’	  (Wood	  180).	  	  	  	   In	   their	   judgments,	   they	   found	   the	  NBA	   guilty	   of	   negligence	   of	   duty	   in	   not	  approaching	   the	   Court	   before	   1994,	   by	   which	   time	   construction	   had	   begun,	   and	  significant	  amounts	  of	  public	  money	  had	  been	  spent.	  	  They	  also	  judged	  that	  issues	  of	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  the	  height	  of	  the	  dam,	  extent	  of	  submergence	  and	  hydrology	  was	  not	  a	  matter	  open	  to	  challenge	  from	  the	  petitioners	  or	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court.	  By	  doing	  so,	  they	   curtailed	   the	   ability	  of	   the	  public	   to	   challenge	  government	  decisions	   through	  the	  Court.	  The	  Court	  also	  found	  the	  rehabilitation	  and	  relief	  measures	  adequate,	  and	  upheld	   the	  binding	  verdict	  of	   the	  Tribunal’s	  award	  (Wood	  179-­‐184).	   In	   the	  end,	   it	  was	  a	   judicial	  decision	   that	  ended	   the	  stalemate	  between	   the	  government	  and	   the	  anti-­‐dam	  opposition.	  	  	   Some	  observers	  speculate	  that	  there	  were	  significant	  political	  considerations	  in	   the	   Court’s	   decision.	   At	   the	   point	   of	   the	   judgment,	   over	   half	   the	   dam	  had	   been	  built	  and	  millions	  of	  dollars	  spent	  on	   its	  construction.	  A	  complete	  stop	  of	   the	  dam	  would	  not	  only	  reflect	  badly	  on	  the	  government	  of	  India,	  and	  bring	  into	  question	  the	  legitimacy	   of	   numerous	   other	   ongoing	   dam	   and	   development	   projects,	   but	   also	  ensure	  that	  no	  benefits	  would	  ever	  come	  from	  the	  long-­‐awaited	  SSP	  (Wood	  182).	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Conclusion	  
	  	   The	  debate	  regarding	  dams	  places	  countries	  into	  two	  camps,	  with	  developed	  countries	  on	  one	  side	  and	  developing	  countries	  on	  the	  other.	   It	   reflects	  conflicting	  visions	  of	  development.	  Developing	  countries	  argue	  that	  a	  double	  standard	  is	  placed	  on	  them,	  as	  developed	  countries	  were	  not	  required	  to	  abide	  by	  very	  high	  standards	  when	   they	  were	   still	   developing.	  Developing	   countries	   often	   frame	  environmental	  mitigation	  and	  the	  strong	  protection	  of	  human	  rights	  as	  ‘luxuries’,	  while	  developed	  countries	  see	  them	  as	  necessary	  boundaries	  of	  development.	  	  	   Something	  that	  is	  often	  lost	  in	  the	  righteous	  struggle	  of	  anti-­‐dam	  activism	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  development	  can	  be	  just	  as	  devastating	  on	  the	  environment	  and	  people	  as	  the	  developments	  which	  they	  oppose.	  Despite	  all	  the	  challenges	  and	  uncertainty	  in	   picking	   a	   path	   for	   development,	   different	   sides	   must	   engage	   to	   create	   a	   new	  paradigm.	   This	   challenge	   must	   be	   met	   with	   new	   tools	   and	   with	   a	   willingness	   to	  compromise,	  an	  emphasis	  on	  equitable	  development,	  and	  a	  move	  away	   from	  pure	  economic	   accounting.	   Equitable	   compensation	   and	   a	   fair	   share	   of	   the	   benefits	   to	  oustees	  is	  an	  achievable	  goal	  that	  must	  be	  prioritized,	  and	  will	  answer	  many	  of	  the	  reservations	  of	  the	  anti-­‐dam	  movement.	  Environmental	  ramifications	  remain	  harder	  to	   account	   for	   and	   to	   mitigate,	   but	   as	   new	   data	   becomes	   available,	   it	   should	  incorporated	  into	  analyses	  and	  policy.	  	  	   The	  controversy	  over	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  calculations	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  divide	   in	   the	   Sardar	   Sarovar	   project	   illustrates	   that	   cost	   benefit	   analyses	   can	   be	  subverted	  into	  a	  	  strategy	  of	  competing	  truth	  claims	  with	  both	  sides	  seeking	  to	  claim	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  the	   higher	   ground	   of	   rationality	   and	   neutrality.	   This	   decades-­‐long	   struggle	   shows	  that	  at	  the	  end,	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis,	  with	  all	  its	  uncertainties	  and	  contingencies,	  is	  a	  fraught	   exercise	  whose	   final	   result	   is	   often	  more	   dependent	   on	   political	   variables	  than	   economic	   ones.
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Appendix	  Table	  1.	  Projected	  Costs	  	  
NWDT	  Award	  
$15	  billion	  over	  45	  years	   for	   the	  entire	  Narmada	  Basin	  program	  
(including	  SSP).	  Total	  cost	  of	  SSP	  (1983)	  set	  at	  $6.3	  billion.	  	  
Tata	   Economic	  
Consulting	  Services	   Rs	  48,870	  million	  over	  23	  years.	  	  
World	  Bank	  (1975)	  	   Rs	  62,639	  million	  for	  power	  and	  irrigation	  dam.	  	  
	  
Source:	  Dwivedi	  109-­110	  
	  Table	  2.	  Displacement	  Figures	  
Source	   Number	  of	  Displaced	  
Narmada	   Water	  
Disputes	  Tribunal	  (1979)	  
6,603	   families	   in	   M.P.	   and	   Maharashtra,	   another	   8,500	  
families	  in	  Gujarat	  based	  on	  1981	  census.	  	  
Government	   of	   India	  
(1983)	  
At	  least	  225,000	  individuals,	  given	  approximately	  5.5	  members	  
per	  family	  in	  Gujarat,	  6	  in	  M.P.	  and	  8.5	  in	  Maharashtra.	  	  
World	  Bank	  Independent	  
Review	  (1992)	  
Estimated	   25,000	   families	   to	   be	   resettled	   from	   Madhya	  
Pradesh	  and	  Maharashtra.	  	  
Michael	  Cernea	  (1999)	  	   Over	  200,000	  people.	  	  
Thayer	  Scudder	  (2003)	  
Including	   canal	   owners,	   landless	   laborers,	   and	   forest	  
encroachers,	   number	   of	   those	   displaced	   could	   exceed	  
500,000.	  
	  
Sources:	  Dwivedi	  128,	  Scudder	  2003.	  	  
	  Table	  3.	  Return	  Calculations	  	  
Gujarat	  government’s	  1983	  appraisal	   18.3%	   at	   12%	   discount	   rate,	   project	  
horizon	  of	  51	  years	  
World	  Bank’s	  1985	  estimation	   13%	  at	  12%	  discount	  rate,	  project	  horizon	  
of	  50	  years	  
World	  Bank’s	  1985	  sensitivity	  analysis	  (risk	  
analysis)	  
Projected	  ERR	  between	  7.4%	  and	  18.9%	  
Gujarat	  government’s	  1988	  reappraisal	   13.12%	   IRR,	  with	  assumption	  of	   	   10	   years	  
project	   implementation	   instead	   of	   17-­‐22	  
years	  
World	  Bank’s	  1990	  reappraisal	   12.1%	   IRR,	   with	   assumption	   of	   12	   years	  
construction	  instead	  of	  10	  years	  
	  57	  	  
-­‐	   Adjusted	   resettlement	   costs	   upwards	   by	  
300%,	   yields	   in	   less	   suitable	   soil	   adjusted	  
down	   25%,	   environmental	   benefits	   and	  
losses	  added	  
	  
Source:	  Dwivedi	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  Table	  4.	  Timeline	  of	  Sardar	  Sarovar	  Project	  
1946	   Government	   of	   two	   states	   ask	   the	   Central	   Waterways,	   Irrigation	   and	  
Navigation	   Commission	   (CWINC)	   to	   undertake	   a	   basin-­‐wide	   investigation	  
of	   the	   Narmada	   River	   from	   the	   standpoints	   of	   flood	   control,	   irrigation,	  
power	   and	   navigation	   possibilities.	   The	   commission	   reveals	   excellent	  
prospects	  and	  recommends	  seven	  potential	  sites.	  
1950	   Planning	   for	   water	   resources	   development	   in	   the	   Narmada	   Basin	   begun	  
through	   three	  major	   projects.	   The	   downstream	  most	   amongst	   the	   three	  
subsequently	  named	  the	  Sardar	  Sarovar	  Project	  after	  Sardar	  Patel.	  
1957-­‐1959	   Preliminary	  proposal	  revised	  to	  build	  the	  reservoir	  in	  two	  stages,	  from	  Full	  
Reservoir	  Level	  49m	  in	  first	  stage	  and	  to	  FRL	  96.7m	  in	  second	  stage.	  
1955-­‐1956	   Gujarat	  and	  West	  India	  faces	  drought.	  
1961	   Bifurcation	   of	   Bombay	   state	   becomes	  Gujarat,	   first	   stage	   of	   construction	  
approved	   in	   February.	   Jawaharlal	   Nehru,	   first	   prime	   minister	   of	  
independent	   India,	   lays	   foundation	   stone.	   New	   states	   of	   Gujarat,	   and	  
Maharashtra	  and	  Madhya	  Pradesh	  upstream	  review	  planning	  afresh.	  	  
1963	   After	   new	   surveys	   done	   a	   new	   dam	   site	  with	   greater	   storage	   capacity	   is	  
selected,	   and	   the	   plans	   discussed	   at	   meetings	   between	   the	   government	  
and	  Gujarat	   and	  Madhya	   Pradesh	   chief	  ministers.	   	   Results	   in	   the	   Bhopal	  
Agreement,	  sharing	  costs	  and	  benefits	  between	  Gujarat,	  Madhya	  Pradesh	  
and	  Maharashtra.	  	  
1963	   Bhopal	   Agreement	   is	   rejected	   by	   the	   Madhya	   Pradesh	   Legislative	  
Assembly,	   but	   ratified	  by	   the	  Gujarat	   Legislative	  Assembly.	   The	  height	  of	  
the	   Navagam	   dam	   determines	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   irrigation	   potential	   in	  
Gujarat	   but	   also	   the	   amount	   of	   submergence	   affecting	  Madhya	   Pradesh	  
and	  Maharashtra.	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1964	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   consensus,	   an	   Expert	   Committee	   chaired	   by	   Dr.	  
A.N.Khosla	  considered	  various	  proposals	  and	  recommends	  a	  high	  dam	  with	  
FRL	  152.4	  m.	  The	  committee	  proposes	  13	  major	  projects	  on	  the	  Narmada,	  
12	   in	   Madhya	   Pradesh	   and	   1	   in	   Gujarat.	   The	   committee	   recommended	  
irrigation	  of	  over	  1.8	  Mha	  through	  a	  right	  bank	  canal	  in	  the	  northern	  region	  
of	   Gujarat,	   also	   to	   cover	   parts	   of	   the	   state’s	   western	   peninsulas	   of	  
Saurashtra	  and	  Kutch,	  as	  well	  as	  extension	  into	  Rajasthan.	  Gujarat	  accepts	  
the	   recommendations	   of	   the	   committee,	   while	   Madhya	   Pradesh	   and	  
Maharashtra	  reject	  them.	  	  
1965	   Madhya	   Pradesh	   and	  Maharashtra	   sign	   agreement	   to	   build	   hydroelectric	  
dam	   at	   Jalsindhi,	   challenging	   the	   Expert	   Committee’s	   allocations.	   No	  
consensus	  by	  the	  states	  even	  after	  Chief	  Ministers	  agree	  on	  Navagam	  dam	  
height,	  however	  Madhya	  Pradesh’s	  Chief	  Minister	  cannot	  get	  cabinet	  to	  go	  
along	  with	  his	  plan	  and	  negotiations	  fail.	  
1967	   Indira	  Gandhi	   is	   re-­‐elected	   but	  with	   a	  weakened	  majority.	   Deputy	   prime	  
minister	  Morarji	  Desai,	  who	  has	  strong	  support	  in	  Gujarat,	  challenged	  her	  
and	   lost.	   Gujarat	   government’s	   weak	   connections	   to	   Mrs	   Gandhi’s	  
government	   probably	   reduced	   the	   center’s	   incentives	   to	   deal	   with	  
Narmada	  issue.	  
1968-­‐1969	   Gujarat	  and	  West	  India	  faces	  drought.	  
1969	   Gujarat	  files	  complaint	  with	  Government	  of	  India	  under	  India’s	  Inter-­‐State	  
Water	   Dispute	   Act,	   1956.	   Formation	   of	   the	   Narmada	   Water	   Dispute	  
Tribunal.	   M.P.	   and	   Maharashtra	   Chief	   Ministers	   jointly	   declare	   their	  
opposition	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  NWDT.	  M.P.	  files	  writ	  petition	  to	  Delhi	  
High	   Court,	   seeking	   to	   restrain	   central	   government	   from	   constituting	   a	  
tribunal	   and	   disputing	   that	   Rajasthan’s	   claim	   to	   be	   a	   disputant	   in	   the	  
award.	  
1972	   Mrs	   Gandhi’s	   party	   has	   overwhelming	  win,	   all	   the	   disputant	   states	   have	  
Congress	   governments.	   While	   the	   Chief	   Ministers	   attempted	   new	   talks	  
with	   the	   Prime	   Minister’s	   assistance,	   monsoon	   failures	   and	   rising	   food	  
prices	   in	   the	   next	   few	   years	   create	   public	   anger	   and	   reduces	   political	  
leverage	   for	   the	   center.	   However,	   Rajasthan	   is	   included	   in	   the	   disputant	  
states	   and	   Chief	   Ministers	   agree	   that	   quantum	   of	   river	   available	   for	  




Gujarat	   and	   West	   India	   faces	   drought.	   Drought-­‐relief	   measures	   cost	  
government	  millions	  of	  rupees.	  
1974	   NWDT	   resumes	   deliberations.	   Tribunal	   made	   a	   point	   of	   not	   meeting	  
politicians.	  Hearings	  and	  consultations	  with	  affected	  peoples	  are	  not	  held,	  
and	  environmental	  issues	  are	  never	  brought	  up.	  	  
1975-­‐1977	   India	   in	  state	  of	  Emergency	  after	  war	  with	  Pakistan.	  Mrs.	  Gandhi	  virtually	  
an	  authoritarian	  ruler.	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1978	   NWDT	  Award	  mostly	  reiterated	  the	  Expert	  Committee’s	  recommendations	  
and	   favoured	   a	   high	   dam	   at	   the	   same	   site,	   irrigating	   over	   2.1	  Mha	   and	  
generating	  hydropower	  through	  an	  installed	  capacity	  of	  about	  1200	  MW	  in	  
the	   riverbed	   powerhouse	   and	   300	   MW	   in	   the	   canal	   head	   powerhouse.	  
Award	   planned	   for	   interlinking	   canals	   that	   depend	   on	   a	   computerized	  
system	  coordinating	  the	  entire	  network	  of	  upstream	  dams	  and	  reservoirs,	  
such	   that	   as	   each	   of	   the	   latter	   filled	   up	   during	   the	  monsoon	   season,	   its	  
water	  would	   be	   released	   gradually	   to	  maximize	   storage	   and	   keep	   Sardar	  
Sarovar	  and	  the	  canal	  system	  operating	  year	  round.	  Allocation	  was	  for	  75%	  
dependable	   yield	   of	   about	   35.8	   BCM	   (billion	   cubic	  meters)	   for	   irrigation	  
between	  the	  three	  riparian	  states	  and	  to	  the	  fourth	  water-­‐deficit	  state	  of	  
Rajasthan	   to	   the	  north	  of	  Gujarat.	   The	  hydropower	   to	  be	   generated	  was	  
allotted	   only	   to	   the	   three	   riparian	   states.	   A	   detailed	   project	   report	   was	  
then	  prepared	  by	  Gujarat	  state.	  Gujarat	  would	  receive	  a	  disproportionate	  
share	  of	   the	  water	  due	   to	  higher	  need	  and	  no	  other	   river	   to	   rely	  on,	  but	  
they	  would	  bear	  most	  of	   the	  costs.	  R&R	  package	   (land	   for	   land)	   is	  better	  
than	  the	  current	  standard	  of	  cash	  for	   land.	  At	  the	  time	  the	  ‘weighing	  and	  
balancing’	   undertaken	   by	   the	   Tribunal	   in	   its	   equitable	   apportionment	  
approach	  and	  the	  resultant	  trade-­‐offs	  it	  created	  made	  its	  Award	  politically	  
acceptable	  in	  a	  way	  that	  had	  often	  seemed	  impossible	  during	  the	  previous	  
two	  decades.	  
1980	   The	  Narmada	  Control	   Authority	   (NCA)	  was	   established	   to	   implement	   the	  
tribunal’s	   decisions.	   NCA	   set	   up	   separate	   subgroups	   to	   look	   into	  
rehabilitation	   and	   resettlement,	   environment	   and	   other	   aspects	   of	   the	  
award.	   Sardar	   Sarovar	   Construction	   Advisory	   Committee	   (SSCAC)	   was	  
formed	   to	   advise	   the	   Government	   of	   Gujarat	   on	   its	   construction.	   The	  
anticipated	  benefits	  of	  the	  Sardar	  Sarovar	  Project	  cover	  almost	  75%	  of	  the	  
population	  of	  Gujarat.	  	  
1980	   Beginning	  of	  NGO	   (voluntary	   activism)	  movement	   in	   India.	  Gujarat	  NGOs	  
start	  to	  form,	  primarily	  concerned	  about	  the	  plight	  of	  adivasi	  oustees.	  
1983-­‐1985	  	   As	   World	   Bank’s	   principal	   SSP	   resettlement	   consultant,	   Thayer	   Scudder	  
visits	  India	  several	  times	  and	  writes	  of	  the	  poor	  implementation	  of	  R&R	  in	  
affected	  villages.	  	  	  
1986	   World	  Bank’s	  Board	  approve	  SSP	  for	  a	  US$200	  million	  loan	  and	  combined	  
US$140	   million	   IDA	   credit,	   subject	   to	   16	   covenants	   dealing	   with	  
resettlements,	  three	  on	  health	  and	  three	  on	  environment.	  	  	  
1980-­‐1985	   Department	   of	   Environment	   and	   Forests,	   set	   up	   in	   1980,	   had	   refused	  
environmental	   clearance	   to	   the	   project.	   When	   upgraded	   to	   Ministry	   in	  
1985,	   came	   under	   pressure	   from	   different	   sides	   to	   release	   forest	   land.	  
Project	   authorities	   go	   ahead	   and	   sign	   loan	   agreements	   with	   the	   World	  
Bank	  without	  the	  mandatory	  environmental	  clearance	  from	  the	  MoEF.	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1987	   India’s	   Environmental	   Protection	   Act	   passed,	   environmental	   clearance	  
required	   and	   conditionally	   obtained	   in	   June	   (under	   significant	   pressure	  
from	   the	   World	   Bank	   and	   government	   of	   India),	   asking	   the	   states	  
concerned	  to	  take	  certain	  steps	  including	  resettlement	  and	  rehabilitation,	  
pari	  passu	  (in	  step	  with)	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  dam.	  	  
1987	   Arch-­‐Vahini	  (Gujarat	  NGO)	  scores	  victory	  in	  gaining	  R&R	  concessions	  from	  
the	  Gujarat	  government.	  	  
1989	   Two	   committees	   set	   up	   by	  Medha	   Patkar	   protesting	   the	   dam	   in	  Madha	  
Pradesh	   and	  Maharashtra	   merge	   to	   form	   the	   Narmada	   Bachao	   Andolan	  
(“Struggle	   to	   Save	   the	   Narmada”).	   NBA	   campaign	   starts	   gaining	   national	  
and	  international	  publicity.	  	  
1989	   Morse	  Commission,	  set	  up	  by	  World	  Bank	  due	  to	  pressure	   from	  activists,	  
recommends	   consultation	  with	   project-­‐affected	   families	   for	   resettlement	  
and	  rehabilitation	  package.	  
1990	   Confrontations	   between	   Gujarat	   government,	   NBA	   supporters,	   and	  
affected	   peoples	   become	   more	   heated.	   At	   its	   height,	   the	   Gujarat	   and	  
Maharashtra	  police	  are	  called	  in	  to	  move	  Manibeli	  residents.	  	  
1991	   World	   Bank	   Independent	   Review	   is	   commissioned	   after	   pressure	   from	  
several	  member	   countries	   to	   assess	   project	   implementation	   in	   regard	   to	  
R&R	  and	  environmental	  impact.	  	  
	   Subsequent	  Morse	   and	   Berger	   report	   is	   critical	   of	   the	   SSP,	   citing	   lack	   of	  
basic	   data	   and	   planning	   for	   financial,	   environmental	   and	   rehabilitation	  
costs,	   as	   well	   as	   blaming	   the	   World	   Bank	   for	   not	   abiding	   with	   a	   more	  
stringent	  standard	  before	  awarding	  loan.	  Calls	  for	  a	  suspension	  of	  funding.	  
Report	   is	   rejected	   by	   the	   government	   of	   India.	   World	   Bank	   also	   not	  
convinced	  of	  the	  acceptability	  of	  the	  report,	  assures	   India	   it	  will	  continue	  
funding.	   However,	   World	   Bank	   continues	   to	   bring	   up	   issues	   with	   Indian	  
Government.	  
1993	   After	  a	  split	  vote	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  pull	  out	  of	  the	  dam,	  the	  World	  Bank	  
agrees	   to	   continue	   funding	   the	   project	   on	   the	   face-­‐saving	   condition	   that	  
the	   Indian	   government	   meet	   six	   bench-­‐marks	   related	   to	   resettlement,	  
including	   improved	   data	   of	   project-­‐affected	   people	   and	   satisfactory	  
resettlement	   and	   rehabilitation	   plans	   in	   all	   three	   states,	   in	   six	   months.	  
Government	   ‘forced’	   to	   ask	   World	   Bank	   to	   withdraw	   from	   the	   Sardar	  
Sarovar	  project.	  Five	  Member	  Group	  of	  experts	  set	  up	  by	  Ministry	  of	  Water	  
Resources	   to	  conduct	   review	  discussions	   in	   response	   to	  suggestions	   from	  
protesting	  activists.	  
1994	   NBA	  files	  Public	  Interest	  Litigation	  in	  Supreme	  Court,	  seeking	  to	  halt	  SSP	  for	  
not	  acting	  on	  various	  conditions	  of	  environmental	  clearance.	  
1995	   Court	  orders	  stay	  on	  continued	  construction	  above	  EI	  80m	  to	  enable	  states	  
to	  fulfill	  the	  pari	  passu	  condition	  satisfactorily.	  This	  is	  seen	  as	  huge	  success	  
for	  NBA.	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1998-­‐2000	   Public	   support	   for	   NBA	   flagging	   due	   to	   public	   weariness	   on	   its	  
uncompromising	   stance.	   Confrontations	   between	   NBA	   and	   its	   former	  
supporter,	  the	  M.P.	  government,	  over	  dam	  construction	  in	  three	  sites.	  NBA	  
resources	  spread	  thinly.	  
1999	   Gujarat	   constituted	   Grievance	   Redressal	   Authority	   to	   directly	   address	  
resettlement	   concerns	   by	   affected	   people,	   and	   is	   praised	   by	   the	   Gujarat	  
Chief	  Minister	  and	  even	  the	  NBA.	  Maharashtra	  and	  Madhya	  Pradesh	  soon	  
follows	  suit.	  
2000	   NBA	   leader	   sits	   on	   WCD.	   WCD	   recommendations	   rejected	   by	   many	   as	  
impractical	  and	  largely	  not	  found	  acceptable	  by	  the	  developing	  world.	  
2000	   Supreme	  Court	   returns	  2-­‐1	  decision	   in	   favor	  of	   raising	  of	  dam	  to	  EI	  95m,	  
ordering	  that	  project	  should	  be	  completed	  at	  the	  earliest	  and	  states	  must	  
comply	   with	   conditions	   regarding	   R&R	   and	   environmental	   impact	  
mitigation.	  NBA	  holds	  protest	  demonstration,	  Medha	  Patkar	  and	  Arundati	  
Roy	   are	   arrested	   for	   contempt	   of	   court	   and	   given	   symbolic	   one-­‐day	  
sentences.	  
2001	   Maharashtra	   government	   agrees	   under	   pressure	   to	   set	   up	   a	   Joint	   Task	  
Force	   on	   resettlement	   with	   NBA	   and	   other	   NGOs.	   Their	   2002	   report	  
concludes	  that	  resettlement	  was	  incomplete	  with	  over	  3000	  families	  yet	  to	  
be	  physically	  relocated	  as	  required,	  while	  rehabilitation	  was	  incomplete	  for	  
the	  500	  families	  that	  had	  moved.	  
2002	   Ministry	  of	  Environment	  and	  Forests	  set	  up	  a	  multi-­‐disciplinary	  committee	  
of	   experts	   to	   review	   fulfillment	   of	   conditions	   laid	   down	   at	   the	   time	   of	  
environmental	   clearance.	   Committee	   reports	   that	   the	   environmental	  
clearance	  conditions	  were	  satisfactorily	  fulfilled.	  
2003	   Supreme	  Court	  allows	  raising	  of	  dam	  to	  EI	  100m.	  During	  monsoon	  season,	  
over	  12,000	  families	  adversely	  affected	  by	  flooding.	  
2004	   NCA	  allowed	  raising	  of	  dam	  to	  EI	  100.64m.	  
2006	   NCA	  allowed	  raising	  of	  dam	  to	  EI	  121.92m,	  after	   reports	  of	  actions	   taken	  
for	   resettlement	   and	   rehabilitation	   had	   been	   vetted	   by	   the	   Grievance	  
Redressal	  Authorities	  of	  the	  three	  states,	  and	  thereafter	  approved	  by	  the	  
Narmada	  Resettlement	  and	  Rehabilitation,	  and	  Environmental	  Sub-­‐Groups	  
of	  the	  NCA.	  After	  protests,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  decides	  to	  stay	  dam.	  Prime	  
Minister	   appoints	   SS	   Relief	   and	   Rehabilitation	   Oversight	   Group	   (OSG)	   to	  
decide	   if	   Award	   was	   given	   to	   M.P.	   fairly,	   and	   NBA	   protests	   manner	   of	  
investigation.	  OSG	  returns	  positive	  verdict	  with	  some	  deficiencies,	  allowing	  
go	  ahead	  of	  the	  project.	  
2006	   After	   series	   of	   defeats	   in	   dealing	   with	   concerned	   state	   governments,	  
project	   authorities,	  World	   Bank,	   and	   courts	   up	   to	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	  
India,	  the	  Court	  disposes	  of	  NCA’s	  public	  interest	  litigation	  (17	  April	  2006).	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2013	   Height	  of	  dam	  has	  been	  built	  up	  to	  121.92m.	  Contention	  between	  Gujarat	  
state	   government	  and	  opposition	  parties	  over	  who	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	  
failure	   of	   canals	   being	   built	   to	   distribute	   water,	   with	   the	   Gujarat	   state	  
government	   blaming	   the	   Center	   and	   the	   opposition	   blaming	   the	   Chief	  
Minister	  Narendra	  Modi.	  	  
	  
Sources:	  Dwivedi	  2006;	  Wood	  2007;	  Thatte	  	  in	  Tortajada,	  Altinbilek	  and	  Biswas	  2012,	  
India	  Times	  2013	  
	  
	  Table	   5.	   Points	   in	   Government	   Cost	   Benefit	   Analysis	   Challenged	   by	   the	   Narmada	  Movement,	  and	  the	  Official	  Response	  	  
Amount	   of	  
water	   in	   the	  
Narmada	  
The	  Narmada	  movement	   challenged	   the	   estimates	   of	  water	   based	   on	  
hind-­‐casting,	   arguing	   it	   was	   overoptimistic.	   They	   provide	   their	   own,	  
lower,	  figure.	  	  
Officials	   respond	   that	   hind-­‐casting	   is	   an	   acceptable	   method,	   and	   was	  




The	  Narmada	  movement	  believes	  60%	  utilizable	  flow	  is	  too	  high.	  
Likelihood	  




The	  Narmada	  movement	  argues	  that	  large	  parts	  of	  the	  water-­‐deficient	  
areas	  in	  Gujarat	  are	  not	  in	  the	  proposed	  command	  areas,	  and	  they	  also	  
lie	  at	  the	  tail	  end.	  If	  water	  use	  intensifies	  in	  the	  already	  developed	  
districts	  of	  Baroda,	  Bharuch	  and	  Ahmedabad,	  they	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  
reap	  benefits.	  	  
There	  would	  probably	  be	  an	  increased	  concentration	  in	  head	  end	  of	  
water-­‐intensive	  cropping,	  reducing	  downstream	  supply.	  Downstream	  
releases	  of	  water	  for	  environmental	  mitigation	  purposes	  will	  also	  reduce	  
water	  to	  the	  command	  area.	  Project	  authorities	  respond	  that	  they	  have	  
never	  claimed	  the	  water	  can	  reach	  all	  areas	  -­‐	  it	  is	  governed	  by	  supply	  
constraints,	  water	  scarcity,	  drought-­‐proneness,	  and	  ultimate	  irrigation	  
potential	  of	  the	  district.	  They	  also	  counter	  with	  proposed	  innovations	  in	  
water	  management.	  	  
Suitability	  of	  
Command	  
Area	   for	  
Irrigation	  
ORG’s	  studies	  showed	  that	  only	  10%	  of	  the	  SSP	  command	  is	  eminently	  
suitable	  for	   irrigation,	  another	  40%	  suitable,	  and	   large	  tracts	  of	   land	   in	  
Gujarat’s	  command	  area	  tail	  end	  found	  unsuitable.	  This	  creates	  fear	  of	  
waterlogging	  and	  salinization.	  	  
Project	   authorities	   argue	   this	   problem	   is	   anticipated	   and	   control	  
measures	  have	  been	  devised.	  




The	  Narmada	  movement	   claim	   that	   the	  power	  benefits	   are	  deceptive,	  
actual	  power	  generation	  in	  first	  phase	  is	  only	  439	  MW	  and	  in	  final	  phase	  	  
only	  50	  MW.	  The	  RBPH	  has	   faced	   technical	  and	   financial	   setbacks	  and	  
may	   have	   to	   be	   abandoned.	   As	   peak	   demand	   operation	   consumes	  
power	   and	   catchment	   treatment	   in	   other	   projects	   has	   been	  poor,	   the	  
cumulative	  effect	  is	  30-­‐50%	  of	  power	  loss,	  which	  makes	  the	  component	  
uneconomic.	   Social	   cost	   is	   also	   enormous	   (70%	   more	   population	  
affected	  for	  an	  extra	  19	  ft	  of	  dam).	  	  
Authorities’	   argument	   is	   that	   hydro	   is	   cheap,	   cleaner,	   and	   they	   need	  
power	  especially	  in	  the	  western	  grid.	  
Environmen




The	  Narmada	  movement	  criticizes	  the	  credibility	  of	  studies	  and	  outline	  
many	  risks.	  Forest	  losses	  are	  not	  properly	  accounted	  for,	  the	  seismic	  
impact	  not	  properly	  assessed,	  and	  credible	  action	  plans	  for	  proper	  
surface	  and	  vertical	  drainage	  is	  lacking.	  The	  parri	  passu	  clause	  viewed	  
with	  suspicion,	  can	  continue	  construction	  even	  when	  studies	  have	  not	  
been	  done.	  
The	  authorities	  basically	  downplay	  most	  of	  the	  risks,	  saying	  forest	  losses	  
are	  not	  as	  significant	  -­‐	  virtually	  all	  forests	  were	  degraded,	  fear	  of	  
earthquakes	  is	  displaced,	  and	  that	  downstream	  impact	  is	  not	  all	  
negative	  as	  they	  reap	  irrigation	  benefits.	  
	  
Source:	  Dwivedi	  196-­226
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